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State civil courts are central institutions in American
democracy. Though designed for dispute resolution, these courts
function as emergency rooms for social needs in the face of the
failure of the legislative and executive branches to disrupt or
mitigate inequality. We reconsider national case data to analyze the
presence of social needs in state civil cases. We then use original data
from courtroom observation and interviews to theorize how state
civil courts grapple with the mismatch between the social needs
people bring to these courts and their institutional design. This
institutional mismatch leads to two roles of state civil courts that
are in tension. First, state civil courts can function as violent actors.
Second, they have become unseen, collective policymakers in our
democracy. This mismatch and the roles that result should spur us
to reimagine state civil courts as institutions. Such institutional
change requires broad mobilization toward meeting people’s social
needs across the branches of government and thus rightsizing state
civil courts’ democratic role.
INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................................ 2
I. WHAT STATE CIVIL COURTS DO ........................................................................................... 6
A. The Institutional Context ................................................................................... 7
1. Courts Designed for Dispute Resolution ............................................. 7
2. Inequality .......................................................................................................... 9
B. State Civil Case Data Reconsidered............................................................. 14
1. Relationships................................................................................................ 17
2. Children .......................................................................................................... 20
3. Housing ........................................................................................................... 23
* Clinical Professor of Law, Columbia Law School.
** Professor of Law, George Washington University Law School.
*** Assistant Professor of Government, Wesleyan University.
**** Professor of Law, University of Utah S.J. Quinney College of Law.
Thank you to stellar research assistants Meir Blesofsky, Adia Davis, Renyang Gao, Michelle
Gomez-Reichman, Aarti Goyal, Tanner Lockhead, Seojin Park, Ashton Ruff, Catherine Twigg,
Mason Walther, and Amanda Yang. Thank you to Pamela Bookman, Lincoln Caplan, Kellen
Funk, Kathryn Sabbeth, Rebecca Sandefur, Jane Spinak, Susan Sturm, the participants in the
American Academy of Arts & Sciences Access to Justice Authors’ Conference, and the
participants in the Columbia Law School and Georgetown University Law Center Faculty
Workshops for feedback. Thank you to our institutions and speciXically the William S.
Friedman Faculty Research Fund at Columbia Law School, for research support.

1

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4143712

2

COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 0:1

4. Small Claims (Including Debt Collection) ........................................ 24
5. The Rest of Civil Justice Needs Cases................................................. 25
6. Quantifying Cases With Social Needs ................................................ 27
C. Social Needs in the Courtroom ..................................................................... 28
II. HOW COURTS RESPOND TO THE INSTITUTIONAL MISMATCH..................................... 32
A. Avoid Social Needs ............................................................................................. 34
B. Attempt to Meet Social Needs ....................................................................... 37
C. Create Law or Procedure ................................................................................ 38
D. Create New Institutions ................................................................................... 42
III. A THEORY OF STATE CIVIL COURTS’ INSTITUTIONAL ROLE ...................................... 46
A. Courts as Violent Actors .................................................................................. 47
B. Courts as Policymakers .................................................................................... 51
CONCLUSION.............................................................................................................................. 57
INTRODUCTION
Across the country, the courtroom door marked “Housing Court”
reveals a judge listening to hour after hour of people on the verge of losing
their homes because they have lost a job, had an unexpected medical
expense, cannot afford child care, have a family member engaged in the
criminal legal system, or complained about the condition of their home or
that the rent will always be too high. The litigants in housing court are
disproportionately Black, though the racial and ethnic background of those
facing the loss of their home varies across the country.1 Most of the people
facing this life-altering consequence are women,2 almost none of whom
have a lawyer, though many of their landlords do,3 and losing their home
will immediately harm their economic security, family integrity, and mental
and physical health.4 The litigants in housing court do not end up behind
1. Peter Hepburn, Renee Louis & Matthew Desmond, Racial and Gender Disparities
Among Evicted Americans, 7 Socio. Sci. 649, 653–58 (2020) (showing that “for every 100
eviction Xilings to white renters, . . . there were nearly 80 eviction Xilings to black renters” and
that the percentage of eviction Xilings against Black renters in the ten largest counties studied
ranged from 16.6% in Middlesex, Massachusetts to 61.3% in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania); see
also Deena Greenberg, Carl Gershenson & Matthew Desmond, Discrimination in Evictions:
Empirical Evidence and Legal Challenges, 51 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 115, 120 (2016) (“Studies
from different cities have found that people of color comprise about eighty percent of those
facing evictions.”).
2. See Kathryn Sabbeth & Jessica K. Steinberg, The Gender of Gideon, 69 UCLA L. Rev.
(forthcoming
2022)
(manuscript
at
11),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3807349
[https://perma.cc/6SGG-YN47].
3. Jessica K. Steinberg, Demand Side Reform in the Poor People’s Court, 47 Conn. L. Rev.
741, 750 (2015) (“In landlord-tenant matters . . . it is typical for ninety percent of tenants to
appear pro se while ninety percent of landlords appear with counsel.”).
4. Emily Benfer, Health Justice: A Framework (and Call to Action) for the Elimination
of Health Inequality and Social Injustice, 65 Am. U. L. Rev. 275, 308–12 (2015)
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that door by coincidence. Rather, this is a foreseeable consequence of the
absence of affordable and adequate housing, health care, child care, and
education, the absence of fair and equal wages, and the presence of mass
incarceration in our society. State civil cases involving debt, family
relationships, and children have different names on the courtroom door but
similar stories behind those doors. The millions of people who come to state
civil courts each year in the United States are in crisis and so, too, are the
courts that hear their cases.
When scholars and reformers talk about this problem, we acknowledge
its overwhelming breadth and depth and then cix our gaze on a particular
group of institutional actors. We theorize their role, quantify behavior and
its impact, consider different roles for actors, or contemplate the role of
technology instead. We might look closely at the experience of litigants,5 the
dominance of certain plaintiffs,6 a lack of lawyers,7 judicial behavior,8 the

(“[C]onsequences of eviction often include prolonged periods of homelessness, job loss,
depression, and subsequent deterioration of health.”).
5. See, e.g., Barbara Bezdek, Silence in the Court: Participation and Subordination of
Poor Tenants, 20 Hofstra L. Rev. 533, 541 (1992) (“At [the] root [of the standard view of legal
institutions] is the acculturated belief that the individual is the proper unit to scrutinize when
analyzing disputes about performance under a lease agreement.”); Russell Engler,
Approaching Ethical Issues Involving Unrepresented Litigants, Clearinghouse Rev. J. Poverty
L. & Pol’y 377, 377 (2009) (approaching ethical issues by focusing Xirst on interactions with
unrepresented adverse parties).
6. See, e.g., Kathryn Sabbeth, (Under)Enforcement of Poor Tenants’ Rights, 27 Geo. J. on
Poverty L. & Pol’y 97, 119-28 (2019) (explaining why the private market fails to represent
tenants as plaintiffs); Daniel Wilf-Townsend, Assembly-Line Plaintiffs, 135 Harv. L. Rev.
(forthcoming 2022) (manuscript at 26–27), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3919050
[https://perma.cc/WUV8-YJPT] (examining the repeat-player plaintiffs behind debt
collection cases).
7. See, e.g., Kathryn A. Sabbeth, Housing Defense as the New Gideon, 41 Harv. J.L. &
Gender 55, 61 (2018) [hereinafter Sabbeth, Housing Defense as the New Gideon] (arguing that
New York City legislation’s focus on defense lawyering limits the impact of appointment of
counsel); Rebecca L. Sandefur, Elements of Professional Expertise: Understanding Relational
and Substantive Expertise Through Lawyers’ Impact, 80 Am. Soc. Rev. 909, 912–16 (2015)
(“Unrepresented litigants are common, with an average of 73 percent of the focal parties in
each study appearing without any representation, and no representation characterizing 85
percent of the observed cases.”).
8. See Anna E. Carpenter, Active Judging and Access to Justice, 93 Notre Dame L. Rev.
647, 651–55 (2017) (examining the impact of active judging on unrepresented litigants);
Anna E. Carpenter, Colleen F. Shanahan, Jessica Steinberg & Alyx Mark, Judges in Lawyerless
Courts,
110
Geo.
L.J.
(forthcoming
2022)
(manuscript
at
5–6),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3793724 [https://perma.cc/TBV7-GNFU] [hereinafter Carpenter
et al., Judges in Lawyerless Courts] (examining the “unfettered discretion” judges have in
lawyerless courts with unrepresented litigants); Michael C. Pollack, Courts Beyond Judging,
46 BYU L. Rev. 719, 724, 730–58 (2021) (“State court judges engage in decisionmaking in a
whole host of non-adversarial settings outside of the traditional context of dispute
resolution.”); Jessica K. Steinberg, Adversary Breakdown and Judicial Role Confusion in “Small
Case” Civil Justice, 2016 BYU L. Rev. 899, 906, 919–26 [hereinafter Steinberg, Adversary
Breakdown] (“[J]udges are responding to an inXlexible passive norm by abandoning it entirely.
In some matters, judges extensively question parties and witnesses. In others, they relax or
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power of court staff,9 or technological intervention.10 This actor-focused
view of state civil courts obscures the depth of the problem. The crisis of
state civil courts is an institutional one, grounded in these courts’ role in
democratic governance.11
We aim to steady our gaze with a theory of state civil courts as they are
now, using a new analysis of quantitative data and our own original
qualitative data. We begin with two key elements of state courts’
institutional context. First, the judicial branch is designed for dispute
resolution. Second, the executive and legislative branches have failed to
meet society’s social needs.12
Within this context, we use national data about the caseloads of state
civil courts to recine our understanding of what these courts do. We would
expect to see these courts resolving disputes between parties, but they do
not. Instead, we see an institutional mismatch: State civil courts are
institutions where people bring their social needs more than their disputes.
The work of state civil courts is a daily manifestation of the failure of the
executive and legislative branches to disrupt structural inequality or invest
in systems of care to mitigate it.13 These courts operate in the breach to
address social needs because they cannot decline the cases presented to
them. Thus, the social needs people bring to court are framed as disputes in
eliminate procedural and evidentiary rules. In still others, they raise new legal theories to Xit
the parties’ facts or order relief not requested.”).
9. See, e.g., Russell Engler, And Justice for All—Including the Unrepresented Poor:
Revisiting the Roles of the Judges, Mediators, and Clerks, 67 Fordham L. Rev. 1987, 1988
(2005) (examining the role of the judges, mediators, and clerks in cases involving
unrepresented litigants); Jessica K. Steinberg, Anna E. Carpenter, Colleen F. Shanahan & Alyx
Mark, Judges and the Deregulation of the Lawyer’s Monopoly, 89 Fordham L. Rev. 1315, 1327–
36 (2021) [hereinafter Steinberg et al., Judges and Deregulation] (describing judges and their
reliance on nonlawyer actors who ultimately shape facts, arguments, and outcomes).
10. See David Freeman Engstrom & Jonah B. Gelbach, Legal Tech, Civil Procedure, and
the Future of Adversarialism, 169 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1001, 1004–05 (2021) (describing the
transformative effect of “legal tech” on litigation and civil procedure); Margaret Hagan, The
User Experience of the Internet as a Legal Help Service: DeXining Standards for the Next
Generation of User-Friendly Online Legal Services, 20 Va. J.L. & Tech. 394, 399–402 (2016)
(examining how the internet is currently insufXicient as a legal help resource and discussing
best practices for improving it as a legal help resource); Tanina Rostain, Techno-Optimism &
Access to the Legal System, 148 Daedalus 93, 95 (2019) (“Self-help technologies can play a
useful role in assisting low- and moderate-income people, but they may not be the most
effective means to redress power imbalances produced by income, racial, and other forms of
inequality.”).
11. See Kathryn A. Sabbeth, Market-Based Law Development, The L. & Pol. Econ. Project
(July
21,
2021),
https://lpeproject.org/blog/market-based-law-development/
[https://perma.cc/5UQ8-BRZT] [hereinafter Sabbeth, Market-Based Law Development]
(explaining how the stratiXication of courts affects the development of law).
12. See infra note 19 and accompanying text regarding our use of “social need.”
13. See Colleen F. Shanahan & Anna E. Carpenter, SimpliXied Courts Can’t Solve
Inequality, 148 Daedalus 128, 129 (2019) (“The executive and legislative branches have
aggressively pared back social safety net programs, and the judicial branch is required to hear
the cases that result.”).
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order to access social provision.14 For example, a grandmother—seeking
mental health care and stable housing for her daughter and stability for her
grandchildren—may end up in domestic violence court because framing her
social need as a dispute in need of a protective order is a chance to access
support for her daughter. This leaves state civil courts attempting to
address—within the constraints of their dispute resolution design—the
social needs of litigants. Though invoking incarceration only rarely, state
civil courts grapple with the life-sustaining and life-altering social needs:
housing, employment, family, and economic security.
We then use qualitative data from around the country to see how
courts grapple with this mismatch—how do courts designed for dispute
resolution face litigants’ social needs in the courtroom? The data reveal that
state civil courts are responding in four related ways to this mismatch. First,
courts avoid the social needs presented and hold tight to their dispute
resolution design. Second, courts try to provide services to meet litigants’
social needs. Third, courts develop new, ad hoc law or procedure to meet
litigants’ social needs. Fourth, courts develop new institutions within or
adjacent to the court to meet litigants’ social needs.
State civil courts’ responses to people’s social needs are diffuse and
varied, yet the data allow us to theorize these courts’ actual institutional
role. Our theory captures two institutional roles that are in tension and
reclective of the dissonance of the institutional mismatch. First, the
mismatch between state civil courts’ institutional design and social needs
casts these institutions as violent actors. Decades ago, Professor Robert
Cover warned us that “[w]hen [legal] interpreters have cinished their work,
they frequently leave behind victims whose lives have been torn apart by
these organized, social practices of violence.”15 These observations
originate in criminal courts, and we extend them to civil courts and argue
that the institutional mismatch exacerbates a violent institutional role of
state civil courts. This includes government violence supplanting private
violence, such as the history of eviction matters described by Professor
Shirin Sinnar.16 This violence appears when courts hew to their institutional
design, avoiding social needs but also compounding them in the context of
state control. This role includes the ways in which state civil courts intersect
with mass incarceration, specicically when civil cases can lead to
incarceration as a penalty, such as in child support or domestic violence
matters. At the same time, state civil courts attempting to meet social needs
by providing services can lead to government control and violence in the

14. We use the term social provision to capture “the range of state policies implemented
to improve general welfare.” Abbye Atkinson, Rethinking Credit as Social Provision, 71 Stan.
L. Rev. 1093, 1096 n.2 (2019).
15. Robert M. Cover, Violence and the Word, 95 Yale L.J. 1601, 1601 (1986).
16. Shirin Sinnar, Civil Procedure in the Shadow of Violence, in A Guide to Civil
Procedure: Integrating Critical Legal Perspectives (Portia Pedro, Brooke Coleman, Liz Porter
& Suzette Malveaux eds.) (forthcoming 2022) (manuscript at *2–*5).

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4143712

6

COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 0:1

guise of these needs being met, such as in child welfare matters. It also
includes the violence of the experience of appearing in state civil court.
Second, this mismatch casts state civil courts as policymaking
institutions, in a distinct variation from the policymaking courts that
scholars traditionally worry about. Here, the institutional mismatch
between courts’ dispute resolution design and the social needs of litigants
has led to a diffuse, ad hoc, and unmeasured but nonetheless large-scale
response by courts. Faced with social needs, courts are attempting social
provision, either by stepping into the void left by the executive branch and
providing direct social services—such as housing resources tied to
obtaining a protective order—or by behaving like legislatures by allocating
funding to programs for social provision, often going as far as building new
institutions. In addition, courts create unseen law and procedure to
facilitate these choices in ways that raise concerns about transparency and
process. These small-scale choices are repeating themselves in diffuse ways
across jurisdictions. Collectively, state civil courts have become a branch of
government that develops policy to grapple with social needs without the
institutional design or resources to do so.
From this analysis, we see that institutional—not just operational—
change for state civil courts is imperative, and we begin to imagine a way
forward for state civil courts as democratic institutions.17 We acknowledge
the importance of incremental, actor-focused change to meet the immediate
needs of millions of litigants each year. We also see the imperative of
imagining broad, institutional change that will relieve the tension between
the social needs people bring to court and courts’ dispute resolution design.
Where we now see a social need from one litigant in a dispute, we challenge
ourselves to imagine a world where social provision is completely realized
and the needs of both litigants are met.
I. WHAT STATE CIVIL COURTS DO
“This courtroom is like the emergency room.”18
We begin with two observations about the institutional context of state
civil courts in American democracy. First, our courts are designed as sites
of dispute resolution. Second, the executive and legislative branches have
failed to avoid or mitigate inequality. Though we would expect to see state
civil courts resolving disputes, in the face of inequality, state civil courts do
not necessarily resolve disputes; they actually face and respond in different
ways to people’s social needs.
17. For a different conception of courts as democratic institutions, see Judith Resnik,
Reinventing Courts as Democratic Institutions, 143 Daedalus 9, 10 (2014) (describing courts
as “sites of democracy because the particular and peculiar practices of adjudication produce,
redistribute, and curb power among disputants who disagree in public about the import of
legal rights”).
18. Notes of Hearing 22, Centerville (Judge 1) (addressing litigants in open court). See
also infra notes 116–123 and accompanying text for more on the underlying data.
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We use the term “social need” consistent with scholarly literature and
note that it captures the range of needs (including those that some might
characterize as economic) that are inextricable from racial, economic, and
gender inequality.19 We are intentionally not using the term “legal need.”
The concept of “legal need” itself reclects assumptions about the role of law
in people’s lives, which research shows is not consistent with people’s lived
experience.20 Our examination takes an institutional view of state civil
courts and the problems people bring to them and resists any underlying
assumption that people should engage the legal system to resolve their
problems.
In this context, we engage in a mixed-methods empirical examination
of state civil courts. We take a novel approach to national data on state civil
caseloads, recategorizing cases to reclect the problems people are bringing
to court, not just the formal legal labels for these cases. This reveals the
breadth and depth of social needs presented to state civil courts. We then
examine qualitative data from observations and interviews in state civil
courtrooms to understand how people’s social needs appear in the
courtroom. In the following sections, we analyze how state civil courts
respond to the institutional mismatch.
A.

The Institutional Context
1. Courts Designed for Dispute Resolution. ---

19. See Jonathan Bradshaw, A Taxonomy of Social Need, in Problems and Progress in
Medical Care, Oxford University Press: Oxford (Gordon McLachlan ed., 1972); Mohsen AsadiLari, Chris Packham & David Gray, Need for RedeXining Needs, 34 Health Quality Life
Outcomes 1, 4 (2003) (distinguishing social needs from physical needs, satisfaction,
informational needs, and concern); Giandomenica Becchio, Social Needs, Social Goods, and
Human Associations in the Second Edition of Carl Menger’s Principles, 46 Hist. Pol. Econ. 247,
249–51 (2014) (describing how economic goods can satisfy social needs: common needs
(needs shared by many individuals that a common supply can satisfy, e.g., drinking water),
collective needs (needs demanded by individuals and shared by community, e.g., schools), and
needs of human association (needs demanded by an entity other than individuals)); Erica
Hutchins Coe, Jenny Cordina, Danielle Feffer & Seema Parmar, Understanding the Impact of
Unmet Social Needs on Consumer Health and Healthcare, McKinsey & Co. (Feb. 20, 2020),
https://www.mckinsey.com/industries/healthcare-systems-and-services/ourinsights/understanding-the-impact-of-unmet-social-needs-on-consumer-health-andhealthcare [https://perma.cc/BUY5-B79G] (summarizing Xindings from a McKinsey survey).
Applying the distinctions in Professor Jonathan Bradshaw’s taxonomy of “normative need,”
“felt need,” “expressed need,” and “comparative need” to state civil courts is beyond the scope
of this paper, though it engages many of the questions raised by Professor Rebecca Sandefur’s
work. We also note that narrower deXinitions of social needs appear in other contexts,
including public beneXits legislation. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 3002(24) (2018) (“The term ‘greatest
social need’ means the need caused by noneconomic factors . . . .”).
20. Professor Sandefur’s research shows that people regularly do not perceive their
problems as legal and believe they are able to help themselves, and she theorizes the
implications of these perceptions for the legal system. Rebecca L. Sandefur, Accessing Justice
in the Contemporary USA: Findings From the Community Needs and Services Study (2014);
Rebecca L. Sandefur, What We Know and Need to Know About the Legal Needs of the Public,
67 S.C. L. Rev. 443 (2016).
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The substantive law and procedure of state civil courts rest on the
premise that they are sites of dispute resolution. We assume parties will
come with a dispute, and the court will resolve it.21 That dispute might get
resolved in a formalized, adversarial way that involves lawyers. Or it might
get resolved by party-driven settlement. Or the dispute might be resolved
in a collaborative way involving a third-party facilitator. Regardless of
where the process falls on a continuum of adversarialism, the premise
remains: State civil courts are in the business of resolving disputes between
parties.
This dispute resolution assumption is present in the law and procedure
of state civil courts and permeates legal scholarship, including our own.
Legal scholarship’s focus on federal courts and the idealized, represented,
adversarial system is well documented.22 Scholarship regarding state civil
courts is largely focused on particular actors or characteristics of dispute
resolution.23 Even the most full-throated calls for reconsideration of
adversarialism still accept that courts are sites of dispute resolution.24
Sociolegal research regarding legal problems and experiences similarly
relies on the premise of dispute resolution to examine questions of civil
courts. The classic sociolegal “dispute pyramid” and its progeny, including
the “dispute tree,” as well as the classic framing of legal engagement as
“naming, blaming, and claiming,” all take as a starting point that the business
of courts is dispute resolution.25 The extensive work of leading scholars like
Professors Hazel Genn and Rebecca Sandefur concerning how people
understand and act on their own legal problems still takes as a core premise
21. Robert A. Kagan, Adversarial Legalism: The American Way of Law 3 (2d ed. 2019).
22. Pamela Bookman & Colleen F. Shanahan, A Tale of Two Civil Procedures, 122 Colum.
L. Rev. *** (2022); Anna E. Carpenter, Jessica K. Steinberg, Colleen F. Shanahan & Alyx Mark,
Studying the “New” Civil Judges, 2018 Wis. L. Rev. 249, 268–74 [hereinafter Carpenter et al.,
“New” Civil Judges].
23. See Carpenter et al., Judges in Lawyerless Courts, supra note 8 (manuscript at 22–
23) (“[U]nderstanding judges’ within-case decisions about role implementation, procedure,
and offers of assistance to pro se litigants is a critical contribution . . . .”); Carpenter et al.,
“New” Civil Judges, supra note 22, at 256 (“In this article, we make the case for a research
agenda focused on state courts and the judges who manage and work within them.”); Colleen
F. Shanahan, The Keys to the Kingdom: Judges, Pre-Hearing Procedure, and Access to Justice,
2018 Wis. L. Rev. 215, 218 (focusing on the role of judges in state civil and administrative
courts); Steinberg et al., Judges and Deregulation, supra note 9, at 1316 (drawing on
interviews to demonstrate that “state court judges are leading the charge, out of necessity,
toward de facto deregulation of the legal profession, at least in certain pro se courts”).
24. See, e.g., Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The Trouble With the Adversary System in a
Postmodern, Multicultural World, 38 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 5, 5–6 (1996) (noting that the
adversary system is no longer the “best method for our legal system”); Steinberg, Adversary
Breakdown, supra note 8, at 899 (“Though adversary theory continues to represent the
guiding framework for criminal and civil cases, it is now widely recognized that the traditional
depiction of the passive judge is incomplete.”).
25. See Catherine R. Albiston, Lauren B. Edelman & Joy Milligan, The Dispute Tree and
the Legal Forest, 10 Ann. Rev. L. & Soc. Sci. 105, 107 (2014); William L.F. Felstiner, Richard L.
Abel & Austin Sarat, The Emergence and Transformation of Disputes: Naming, Blaming,
Claiming . . . , 15 Law & Soc’y Rev. 631, 632 (1980).
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that the matters handled by civil courts are disputes to be resolved by the
court in some way. Professor Genn’s early work regarding legal problems in
the United Kingdom illustrated that people are less likely to engage the law
in disputes involving purchases of goods and services and more likely to go
to court in disputes based in relationships or family.26 Professor Sandefur’s
work, among other contributions, decines justiciable events, legal needs,
and cases.27 These decinitions lend needed clarity to access to justice
research, yet reclect the pervasiveness of the dispute resolution construct.
Collectively, this research is commonly characterized as telling us that
people take their “more serious” disputes to court, that poor people
“perceive” fewer legal problems in their lives, or that many people “do
nothing” in the face of a justiciable event or legal case.28 We suggest an
alternate explanation: People have problems to be resolved that are social
needs more than disputes, and this difference underlies their interaction
with civil courts. But before we reach that analysis, we observe that, even in
analysis of underlying problems, the construct of dispute resolution is
pervasive.
The premise of dispute resolution also characterizes the predominant
approaches to reform. In some instances, our reaction to the dysfunction of
state civil courts is to change the actors involved in dispute resolution. This
includes alternative dispute resolution methods and approaches like
community courts. Another approach is to change the nature of how
disputes are resolved, such as shifting to inquisitorial or problem-solving
court models. Yet all of these approaches stay within the boundaries of
dispute resolution: The court engagement begins with two parties
presenting the court with a dispute and then the court offering some
method of resolution.
2. Inequality. --The premise that civil courts are sites of dispute resolution coexists
with the underlying circumstances of inequality in the United States. Thus,
our examination of state civil courts rests on the collective, scholarly
understanding of inequality in the United States and the failure of the
executive and legislative branches of government to address it.

26. Hazel Genn, What Is Civil Justice For? Reform, ADR, and Access to Justice, 24 Yale J.L.
& Humans. 397, 405–06 (2012).
27. Rebecca L. Sandefur & James Teufel, Assessing America’s Access to Civil Justice
Crisis, 11 U.C. Irvine L. Rev. 753, 755–63 (2021) (noting that a justiciable event is a
circumstance shaped by civil law, a legal need is a justiciable event that needs legal expertise
to be handled “properly,” and a case is a circumstance that ends up in court or legal service
system).
28. Rebecca L. Sandefur, The Importance of Doing Nothing: Everyday Problems and
Responses of Inaction, in Transforming Lives: Law and Social Process 112, 112–17 (Pascoe
Pleasence, Alexy Buck & Nigel J. Balmer eds., 2007).
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Income and wealth inequality in the United States is signicicant and
growing.29 Our historical arc of growing inequality is bound up in the
country’s history of racial inequality.30 In 2019, the net worth of a typical
white family was nearly ten times that of the average Black family.31
Scholars have extensively documented the historical underpinnings of this
inequality.32 Economic and social scienticic research documents how

29. In 2021, the top 1% of U.S. citizens owned 32% of the country’s household wealth,
while the bottom half owned only 2%. DFA: Distributional Financial Accounts: Wealth by
Wealth
Percentile
Groups,
Fed.
Rsrv.,
https://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/z1/dataviz/dfa/distribute/chart/#quarter:128;s
eries:Net%20worth;demographic:networth;population:1,3,5,7;units:shares
[https://perma.cc/VLE9-E9R2] (last updated Dec. 17, 2021).
30. The wealth gap between America’s richest and poorest families has more than
doubled from 1989 to 2016. Juliana Menasce Horowitz, Ruth Igielnik & Rakesh Kochhar, Pew
Rsch. Ctr., Most Americans Say There Is Too Much Economic Inequality in the U.S., but Fewer
Than Half Call It a Top Priority 18–19 (2020), https://www.pewresearch.org/socialtrends/wp-content/uploads/sites/3/2020/01/PSDT_01.09.20_economicinequailty_FULL.pdf [https://perma.cc/S5KV-LX7A] (documenting the percent change in
median family wealth over time by quintile).
31. Kriston McIntosh, Emily Moss, Ryan Nunn & Jay Shambaugh, Examining the BlackWhite Wealth Gap, Brookings (Feb. 27, 2020), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/upfront/2020/02/27/examining-the-black-white-wealth-gap/ [https://perma.cc/2MTX-JS7P]
(comparing wealth for median white and median Black households); see also Ana Herná ndez
Kent & Lowell Ricketts, Has Wealth Inequality in America Changed Over Time? Here Are Key
Statistics, Fed. Rsrv. Bank of St. Louis (Dec. 2, 2020), https://www.stlouisfed.org/openvault/2020/december/has-wealth-inequality-changed-over-time-key-statistics
[https://perma.cc/AJ73-GFGR] (noting that the median white family owns $184,000 in assets,
while Black families own $23,000, and Hispanic families own $38,000). Income statistics
reveal similarly stark disparities: The median Black household earned $23,800 less than
white households in 1970, but $33,000 less in 2018, amounting to just 61% of the income of
the median white family. Katherine Schaeffer, 6 Facts About Economic Inequality in the U.S.,
Pew Rsch. Ctr. (Feb. 7, 2020), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2020/02/07/6-factsabout-economic-inequality-in-the-u-s/ [https://perma.cc/7TYB-8YTM] (measuring changes
in relative income in constant 2018 dollars).
32. See, e.g., Robert S. Browne, The Economic Basis for Reparations to Black America, 2
Rev. Black Pol. Econ. 67, 73 (1971) (noting that income produced by enslaved people for their
white owners before 1860 amounted to between $448 and $995 billion). See generally
Brittany Danielle Rawlinson, The Legacy of Slavery and Black-White Wealth Inequality in the
Southern United States (Apr. 6, 2017) (Ph.D. dissertation, Florida State University),
https://diginole.lib.fsu.edu/islandora/object/fsu:507725/datastream/PDF/view,
[https://perma.cc/N45B-ZUX5] (offering an empirical analysis of home ownership, business
ownership, anti-Black lynchings, and incarceration as contributory factors to the wealth gap,
and connecting these practices to the legacy of slavery); Terry Gross, A ‘Forgotten History’ of
How the U.S. Government Segregated America, NPR (May 3, 2017),
https://www.npr.org/2017/05/03/526655831/a-forgotten-history-of-how-the-u-sgovernment-segregated-america [https://perma.cc/P2NY-MEG9] (documenting America’s
history of discrimination in housing).
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discrimination in employment,33 housing,34 education,35 and criminal
justice36 combine to produce vastly unequal conditions on account of race—
and how intergenerational poverty perpetuates this history.37 These
conditions are not just abstract. They translate to specicic problems for
individuals and communities: unaffordable housing; limited access to
health care; child care and elder care; insufcicient employment
opportunities and income; and an absence of pathways to build wealth or
benecit from credit.
Scholars have explored how the actions and inactions of U.S. political
institutions—legislatures and executives—have amplicied American
inequality.38 Some literature describes this connection in terms of
institutional decisions and outcomes. For example, many scholars
emphasize decreases in the real minimum wage and accompanying
increases in wage inequality.39 Other research describes weakened labor

33. See Marianne Bertrand & Sendhil Mullainathan, Are Emily and Greg More
Employable Than Lakisha and Jamal? A Field Experiment on Labor Market Discrimination, 94
Am. Econ. Rev. 991, 1101 (2004) (showing that African-Americans face differential treatment
when searching for jobs); see also Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971)
(providing an example of widespread discriminatory employment practices deployed in the
post-Jim Crow era to harm Black workers).
34. See, e.g., Janelle Jones, The Racial Wealth Gap: How African-Americans Have Been
Shortchanged Out of the Materials to Build Wealth, Econ. Pol’y Inst. (Feb. 13, 2017),
https://www.epi.org/blog/the-racial-wealth-gap-how-african-americans-have-beenshortchanged-out-of-the-materials-to-build-wealth/
[https://perma.cc/8P2U-C53C]
(describing the signiXicance of home equity for wealth accumulation and the structural
barriers to homeownership for Black Americans).
35. See Graziella Bertocchi & Arcangelo Dimico, Slavery, Education, and Inequality 1
(Inst.
for
the
Study
of
Lab.,
Working
Paper
No.
5329,
2010),
https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/51891/1/66886687X.pdf
[https://perma.cc/2WPQ-MBXD] (“[T]he current degree of educational inequality along, the
racial dimension, can be traced to the intensity of slavery before the Civil War.”); Linda
Darling-Hammond, Unequal Opportunity: Race and Education, Brookings (Mar. 1, 1998),
https://www.brookings.edu/articles/unequal-opportunity-race-and-education/
[https://perma.cc/3SKW-C9S4] (describing persistent patterns of discrimination in
education, especially Xinancing and school resources).
36. See generally Michelle Alexander, The New Jim Crow: Mass Incarceration in the Age
of Colorblindness (2012) (describing the Xinancial, social, and cultural implications of mass
incarceration on Black communities in the United States).
37. See Scott Winship, Christopher Pulliam, Ariel Gelrud Shiro, Richard V. Reeves &
Santiago Deambrosi, Long Shadows: The Black-White Gap in Multigenerational Poverty 2
(2021),
https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/LongShadows_Final.pdf [https://perma.cc/2VPR-7M95].
38. For visualizations of wealth and income inequality in the United States and around
the world, see Income Inequality, USA, 1913–2021, World Inequality Database,
https://wid.world/country/usa/ [https://perma.cc/6RJN-MAK7] (last visited Mar. 2, 2022).
39. See, e.g., Tali Kristal & Yinon Cohen, The Causes of Rising Wage Inequality: The Race
Between Institutions and Technology, 15 Socio-Econ. Rev. 187, 188–90 (2017) (Xinding that
between 1968 and 2012, declining unions and reductions in the real minimum wage
accounted for approximately half of the increase in wage inequality in the United States).
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protections and its implications for income inequality.40 Some scholars
emphasize increasingly regressive state and federal tax codes, favorable
treatment of capital over income, and increasingly unequal distributions of
wealth.41 Others tell of the varied role of American government in social
provision over time and in different eras of social welfare design.42 Still
others chronicle how the privatization of public services has exacerbated
inequality, focusing most intensely on state legislative inaction to secure
access to affordable healthcare,43 state divestment from public education,44
and failures to invest in affordable housing.45

40. Id. at 189; see also Richard B. Freeman, Union Wage Practices and Wage Dispersion
Within Establishments, 36 Indus. & Lab. Rels. Rev. 3, 19–20 (1982) (describing how labor
unionization reduces wage inequality).
41. See Emmanuel Saez & Gabriel Zucman, The Triumph of Injustice: How the Rich
Dodge Taxes and How to Make Them Pay 6–7, 9 (2019) (describing how capital,
disproportionately owned by wealthy people, is taxed more favorably than income, and
describing increasing regression in the U.S. tax system); see also Emmanuel Saez & Gabriel
Zucman, Wealth Inequality in the United States Since 1913: Evidence From Capitalized
Income Tax Data 1 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Rsch., Working Paper No. 20625, 2014),
https://www.nber.org/system/Xiles/working_papers/w20625/w20625.pdf
[https://perma.cc/2UG9-93JU] (providing an account of increased wealth inequality).
42. See, e.g., Theda Skocpol, Protecting Soldiers and Mothers 4–11 (1995) (tracing the
history of U.S. government provision of social services over time).
43. Many states refused to expand Medicaid after the passage of the Affordable Care Act,
despite signiXicant federal incentives to do so, thereby increasing inequality. See Robert
Kaestner & Darren Lubotsky, Health Insurance and Income Inequality, 30 J. Econ. Persps. 53,
55 (2016) (Xinding that public investment in Medicare and Medicaid “clearly [has] the effect
of reducing inequality”); Olena Mazurenko, Casey P. Balio, Rajender Agarwal, Aaron E. Carroll
& Nir Menachemi, The Effects of Medicaid Expansion Under the ACA: A Systematic Review, 37
Health Affs. 944, 946 (2018) (noting that Medicaid expansion under the ACA increased
insurance coverage); Status of State Action on the Medicaid Expansion Decision, Kaiser Fam.
Found.,
https://www.kff.org/health-reform/state-indicator/state-activity-aroundexpanding-medicaid-under-the-affordable-careact/?currentTimeframe=0&sortModel=%7B%22colId%22:%22Location%22,%22sort%22:
%22asc%22%7D [https://perma.cc/2ZZR-7ST9] (last updated Feb. 24, 2022) (documenting
state decisions on whether to expand Medicaid after the ACA and identifying dozens of states
declining Medicaid expansion).
44. See Michael Mitchell, Michael Leachman & Matt Saenz, State Higher Education
Funding Cuts Have Pushed Costs to Students, Worsened Inequality, Ctr. on Budget & Pol’y
Priorities 1 (2019), https://www.cbpp.org/sites/default/Xiles/atoms/Xiles/10-24-19sfp.pdf
[https://perma.cc/D3RD-PG9P] (Xinding that state Xiscal divestment increased inequality);
Michelle Jackson & Brian Holzman, A Century of Educational Inequality in the United States,
117 Proc. Nat’l Acad. Scis. U.S.A. 19108, 19114 (2020) (Xinding that “collegiate inequalities
and income inequality are, in fact, rather strongly associated over the twentieth century”).
45. Joint Ctr. for Hous. Stud. of Harv. Univ., The State of the Nation’s Housing 2020 7
(2020),
https://www.jchs.harvard.edu/sites/default/Xiles/reports/Xiles/Harvard_JCHS_The_State_of
_the_Nations_Housing_2020_Report_Revised_120720.pdf
[https://perma.cc/4FGG-6XQ4]
(showing a sustained increase in cost-burdened households since 2000 and describing
signiXicant decreases in housing assistance as a share of nondefense discretionary spending
over the same period).
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Other literature describes how the American political process has
produced inequality. For example, scholars point to how permissive
campaign cinance laws permit the rich to exercise disproportionate
incluence over legislative, electoral, and regulatory processes46 and to how
policymaking itself is structurally designed to favor capture by monied
interests.47 Others argue that state legislative gerrymandering reduces
political responsiveness and accountability, empowering special interests
to exacerbate inequality.48 Scholars note that the failure to address
inequality is caused by legislative gridlock—itself the result of a
policymaking process that involves multiple veto points49 and must
function amidst increasing political polarization.50 Another cield of
literature highlights how ideological shifts that increasingly favor freemarket capitalism and individual responsibility undergird political inaction
on inequality.51
46. Kay Lehman Schlozman, Henry E. Brady & Sidney Verba, Growing Economic
Inequality and Its (Partially) Political Roots, Religions, May 18, 2017, at 1, 2,
https://www.mdpi.com/2077-1444/8/5/97/htm [https://perma.cc/QR6L-QXKV] (“Those
who are economically well-off speak more loudly in politics by giving more money and by
engaging more frequently in . . . political participation. . . . Not only is money a critical resource
for both individual and organizational input into politics, but economic disparities shape the
content of political conXlict.”).
47. See, e.g., Scott H. Ainsworth, The Role of Legislators in the Determination of Interest
Group InXluence, 22 Legis. Stud. Q. 517, 517 (1997). And, of course, this is a reXlection of
straightforward collective action problems. See generally Mancur Olson, The Logic of
Collective Action (rev. ed. 1971) (noting that although all members of a group have “a common
interest in obtaining [some kind of] collective beneXit, they have no common interest in paying
the cost of providing that collective good,” because “[e]ach would prefer that the others pay
the entire cost”).
48. Adam Bonica, Nolan McCarty, Keith T. Poole & Howard Rosenthal, Why Hasn’t
Democracy Slowed Rising Inequality?, 27 J. Econ. Persps. 103, 103–05 (2013) (describing Xive
reasons why the U.S. political system failed to ameliorate rising income inequality: ideological
shifts, low voter participation by poor people, an increase in real income and wealth that
blunts redistributive movements, political inXluence by the rich, and a reduction in democratic
accountability).
49. John Voorheis, Nolan McCarty & Boris Shor, Unequal Incomes, Ideology, and
Gridlock: How Rising Inequality Increases Political Polarization 5 (Aug. 21, 2015)
(unpublished manuscript), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2649215 [https://perma.cc/U6JK6KFB] (claiming “[i]ncreases in political polarization may . . . reduce the capacity of legislators
to (a) enact policies which might constrain further increases in inequality . . . or (b) engage in
redistribution to directly reduce inequality . . . or (c) modernize and reform welfare state
institutions”).
50. Id. at 2–3.
51. See Bonica et al., supra note 48, at 105–10 (“The Democratic party pushed through
the Xinancial regulation of the 1930s, while the Democratic party of the 1990s undid much of
this legislation in its embrace of unregulated Xinancial capitalism . . . .”); Sara Sternberg Greene,
The Bootstrap Trap, 67 Duke L.J. 233, 243–51 (2017) (describing how “the cultural and
accompanying policy shift in American society that emphasized personal responsibility and
work as the basis for a reduced safety net” inXluenced “policy and law surrounding safety net
programs”); Vicki Lens, Public Voices and Public Policy: Changing the Social Discourse on
“Welfare,” 29 J. Socio. & Soc. Welfare 137, 141–46 (2002) (discussing the politicized language
that comprised the discourse on welfare reform).
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The literature on American inequality places heavy responsibility for
people’s social needs on the political branches of government. While it is not
our current purpose to evaluate the explanatory power of these lines of
research, we leverage this body of scholarship as a foundation of our
examination of state civil courts. We acknowledge that we do not capture
the full political dynamics of inequality in the United States, the
consequences of this structural problem, or even the range of institutions
wrapped up in these challenges. Rather, we contribute to those
conversations by examining state civil courts in this context. How do
dispute resolution design and American inequality simultaneously appear
in state civil courts, and what does that mean for the institutional role that
these courts are actually playing?
B.

State Civil Case Data Reconsidered

In this context of dispute resolution design and social inequality, what
are state civil courts doing? A reexamination of national caseload data from
state civil courts provides a baseline empirical understanding of their work.
We resist traditional scholarly and court management classicications of
cases based on area of law and instead examine the nature of the problem
that people face in each case. We might expect to cind that people are asking
courts to resolve disputes, consistent with their institutional design. Our
reexamination of the case data reveals otherwise. Instead, we see the
overwhelming presence of social needs in state civil courts.
We use National Center for State Courts (NCSC) data from 2012–
2019.52 These are approximately 400 million state court matters ciled over
eight years. This is not a complete picture of state civil courts, as described
more fully in the Appendix, but it captures the work of these courts in states
where the vast majority of the population lives.53 NCSC categorizes state
52. As described in the Appendix, our analysis is based on publicly available data from
the National Center for State Courts from 2012–2019. The data have meaningful variation
among states in both data reporting practices and underlying court structures and functions.
Nonetheless, the data are sufXicient to explore the theoretical questions we engage and, we
hope, for broader exploration by others of other questions of state courts as institutions.
53. A chorus has described the challenges of empirical research in state courts. See
Carpenter et al., “New” Civil Judges, supra note 22, at 266 (“Unlike the federal courts, where
data can be downloaded with a few mouse clicks, information from state civil court dockets
remains much less accessible, and in some cases inaccessible, to researchers.”); Sandefur &
Teufel, supra note 27, at 771 (“No consistently collected, nationally representative
information exists to inform on cases, their distributions, or their impacts.”); see also Brian J.
Ostrom, Shauna M. Strickland & Paula L. Hannaford-Agor, Examining Trial Trends in State
Courts: 1976–2002, 1 J. Empirical Legal Stud. 755, 756 (2004) (“The perennial diﬃculty in
compiling accurate and comparable data at the state level can in large measure be pinned on
the fact that there are 50 states with at least 50 different ways of doing business and 50
different levels of commitment to data compilation.”); Rebecca L. Sandefur, Paying Down the
Civil Justice Data DeXicit: Leveraging Existing National Data Collection, 68 S.C. L. Rev. 295, 297
n.6 (2016) (noting a lack of sufXicient detail in electronic case records); Nat’l Ctr. for State Cts.,
Civil Justice Initiative: The Landscape of Civil Litigation in State Courts, at iii (2015),
https://www.ncsc.org/__data/assets/pdf_Xile/0020/13376/civiljusticereport-2015.pdf
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cases by category—civil, criminal, juvenile, domestic relations, and trafcic—
and by case type within each category—such as the “intentional tort” case
type within the “civil” category.
We start by asking which cases are civil justice matters, independent of
NCSC categories. Our categorization differs from traditional approaches in
a core way: We include domestic relations and some matters related to
children, including civil offenses and dependency matters, as civil matters.
What is generally referred to as “family law” is often treated as separate
from analysis of state civil courts.54 Our approach is consistent with our
theoretical perspective. All of the matters in our civil justice needs category
and designated as case types “Relationships” and “Children” are matters
handled in a civil court in the relevant jurisdiction, in most states by the
same judges who hear (by eligibility or in fact) the breadth of civil cases.
They are adjudicated based on the same dispute resolution design, resting
on the same conventions of procedure and evidence. We believe this
categorization most closely tracks the theoretical argument we engage here.
It also presents an intentional contrast with the categorizations used in the
commonly cited and pathbreaking 2015 National Center for State Courts’
Landscape of Civil Litigation in State Courts report and work that builds on
it.55 This approach also allows us to create a separate “juvenile delinquency”
category that more closely parallels adult criminal dockets and reclects the
different institutional structure and role of juvenile courts.

[https://perma.cc/7AJB-SHUD] [hereinafter NCSC, Landscape of Civil Litigation in State
Courts] (“Differences among states concerning data deXinitions, data collection priorities, and
organizational structures make it extremely difXicult to provide national estimates of civil
caseloads with sufXicient granularity to answer the most pressing questions of state court
policymakers.”). The National Center for State Courts data is by far the best available source
regarding state court caseloads.
54. We cannot claim a deXinite explanation for this, but we can observe that state court
dockets are often divided by subject matter, with different judges rotating among case types
clustered around family law, criminal law, and other civil matters. We can also observe that
family law matters are generally about women and children and matters historically
undervalued by the legal system and legal scholarship. See Sabbeth & Steinberg, supra note 2
(manuscript at 3–4). Finally, we can observe that this distinction gathers its own momentum
in legal scholarship as one scholar builds on the work of another. See Yonathan A. Arbel,
Adminization: Gatekeeping Consumer Contracts, 71 Vand. L. Rev. 121, 131 & n.42 (2018)
(noting that most civil litigation consists of claims for consumer credit); Richard M. Hynes,
Broke but Not Bankrupt: Consumer Debt Collection in State Courts, 60 Fla. L. Rev. 1, 21–24
(2008) (same); Wilf-Townsend, supra note 6 (manuscript at 11 n.37) (noting that family and
trafXic are excluded from data in analysis).
55. The Landscape report is a source for recent scholarly work (including our own). It
poses two key differences from our analysis. The Xirst is the categorization of case types and
ultimately what is a “civil” case. The second is that the Landscape report relies on a small
sample (cases from ten counties that are complete reporters in 2012), and we are relying on
aggregate national, multiyear data. We note the consequential distinctions, where relevant,
below. See NCSC, Landscape of Civil Litigation in State Courts, supra note 53, at iii; see also
Family Justice Initiative, The Landscape of Domestic Relations Cases in State Courts, at i
(2015).
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As captured in Table 1B in the Appendix, in these data, around eightysix million cases involve civil justice needs, forty-four million are adult
criminal matters, two million are juvenile delinquency matters, and over
300 million are noncriminal trafcic cases.56 However, these overall numbers
undercount the country’s civil caseloads because they are the sum of states’
case type reporting, and states report by case type inconsistently and
incompletely. In addition to reporting by case types, states also report their
overall caseloads in a particular category, and this reporting is more
complete. For example, as illustrated in the Appendix, from 2012–2019, an
average of forty-four states reported their total civil caseloads but an
average of only twenty-two states reported across all civil justice need case
types.57 This second average captures a wide variation within and across
case type reporting. For example, a range of four to thirteen states reported
in the fraud case type in the data, while a range of thirty-four to forty-three
states reported in the adoption case type.58 If we apply our categorization
and proportions to the total category caseload reporting and extrapolate, a
more accurate count of our civil justice needs category would be an average
of almost twenty million cases per year (or approximately 157 million cases
in the eight years of data).59 As context, over the same eight years that state
courts saw twenty million civil cases, federal courts saw an annual average
of approximately 300,000 civil cases.60
With this understanding of the scope of civil cases, we turn to types of
cases within the civil justice needs category. Typically, cases are classicied
using traditional norms of doctrinal law or court management.61 For
example, a case is labeled a “contract” matter if the dispute arises out of a
contract, regardless of the nature of the parties or their relationship. This
56. See infra Appendix, tbls.1A & 1B. The volume and nature of trafXic cases is worthy of
its own empirical inquiry. We exclude trafXic cases from our deXinition of “civil justice matters”
because these cases are generally not handled in a dispute resolution framework but rather
as administrative citations, sometimes with judges who are not lawyers. See Sara Sternberg
Greene & Kristen M. Renberg, Judging Without a J.D., 121 Colum. L. Rev. *** (2022). We note
also that these trafXic dockets implicate questions of local courts. See Ethan Leib, Local Judges
and Local Government, 18 N.Y.U. J. Legis. & Pub. Pol’y 707, 730–31 (2015) (“Almost every
judge reported that there is locality-state competition for money that comes from the Xines
levied by the courts.”); Alexandra Natapoff, Criminal Municipal Courts, 134 Harv. L. Rev. 964,
1038 (2021) (“[T]rafXic offenses dominate most municipal court dockets.”); Justin WeinsteinTull, The Structures of Local Courts, 106 Va. L. Rev. 1031, 1069 (2020) (“State law gives
municipalities the option to create municipal courts, which handle minor criminal cases as
well as local ordinances and trafXic violations.”).
57. See infra Appendix, tbls.1A & 1B.
58. See infra Appendix, tbl.2.
59. See infra Appendix, tbls.1A & 2. This is the sum of the average annual (2012–2019)
NCSC total civil (14,805,679) + NCSC domestic relations (4,487,066) + NCSC juvenile case
types noted in Table 1B (293,522) = 19,586,267.
60. See infra Appendix, tbl.3.
61. Elizabeth Chambliss, Evidence-Based Lawyer Regulation, 97 Wash. U. L. Rev. 297,
339–40 (2019) (“State court case management systems were developed for operational use,
rather than research.”).
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approach assumes that the problems people bring to court are disputes with
others and categorizes those problems based on their legal constructs.
Through this approach, a dispute between two corporations over a
manufacturing contract is conclated with a suit by a debt collection company
against a low-income individual who could not pay her medical debt. Or an
eviction suit where a landlord is trying to evict a tenant in need of mental
health services for hoarding is counted as a “property” case in the same way
as a dispute regarding the boundaries between two pieces of corporateowned real estate.
We take a different approach, grounded in the substance of the
problem the people bring to court. These different subcategories of civil
cases reveal social needs in state civil courts, ultimately telling a different
story of these courts’ institutional role. Eight of our categories are
substantive: Relationships, Children, Housing, Contract (distinguishing
Debt Collection), Tort, Tax, Property, and Employment. Two are not,
reclecting the limitations of the data: Small Claims matters and Writs and
Appeals. We describe these subcategories from largest to smallest, as
reclected in Table 2.
1. Relationships. --“Relationships” are the biggest category of cases in state civil courts.
These are the cases that involve personal, often familial, relationships
rather than purely economic ones. In total, “Relationships” cases comprise
approximately 30% of state civil court dockets.62 These include divorce,
protective orders, guardianship, estates, and personal trusteeship. The
common thread in these cases as they generally appear in state civil court is
that they implicate personal relationships and involve problems that, with
more resources, the parties might not bring to state civil court or would only
bring in a ministerial fashion.63 As the discussion below illustrates, the
absence of resources appears across the types of “Relationships” cases. For
example, a couple seeking divorce but without the resources to retain
counsel for negotiations requires more from the court. An individual
seeking to arrange guardianship for an elderly relative, or resolving an
estate after the death of a loved one, will engage the court in a more limited
way if they can retain counsel to help them navigate the law. And those
people who do need more state civil court involvement are correspondingly
making themselves more vulnerable to state control.
Another factor in many of these cases is that parties seek government
assistance in some way, and that assistance then requires state civil court
involvement. We discuss this phenomenon in the context of our qualitative
62. See infra Appendix, tbl.2. This is an estimated six million cases per year (30.28% of
19,586,267 total civil justice needs cases per year). See supra note 59.
63. Tonya L. Brito, David J. Pate, Jr. & Jia-Hui Stefanie Wong, “I Do for My Kids”:
Negotiating Race and Racial Inequality in Family Court, 83 Fordham L. Rev. 3027, 3029–30
(2015) (“[T]he adjudication of child support cases shows a judicial colorblindness that
ignores contemporary realities concerning racial inequality in the labor market.”).
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data in section C below, and it is also apparent in the general substance of
these matters. For example, a marital dispute where one party calls the
police to make the other party leave the home, because neither individual
has sufcicient resources to stay somewhere else, would appear as a
protective order in state court. Or a case in which an elderly person with
dementia requires health care might show up as a guardianship proceeding
so that a family member can access legal power and health care services for
the individual.
The largest subset of the “Relationships” category is divorce,
comprising a third of “Relationships” matters.64 The available data do not
show how many of these cases are substantive proceedings and how many
are pro forma proceedings required by law, though recent research
suggests that the latter is a meaningful proportion of these cases.65 Divorce
is paradigmatic of relationship-related civil court matters. People who can
afford counsel are nearly four times more likely to settle divorce-related
matters without involving the court in more than a ministerial fashion.66 For
poor families, “more litigation means the stress and expense of court
involvement continues.”67 Many of those families stay “trapped in marriage”
or are mired in resulting litigation (e.g., protective orders, contract
disputes).68 In many states, the legal process for determining child custody,
child support, spousal support, and protection orders is handled separately
from divorce, exacerbating access issues.69 Socioeconomic status also
impacts “how families fare in divorce and custody cases” which in turn
“impacts how [those families] weather the transition the litigation
represents.”70
Another major subset of the “Relationships” cases is protective orders,
commonly known as domestic violence cases, which constitute about a
quarter of the “Relationships” cases. As we illustrate using qualitative data
in section C below, these cases are deeply intertwined with manifestations
64. See infra Appendix, tbl.2.
65. James Greiner, Ellen Lee Degnan, Thomas Ferriss & Roseanna Sommers, Using
Random Assignment to Measure Court Accessibility for Low-Income Divorce Seekers, Procs.
Nat’l Acad. Scis. U.S.A., Mar. 30, 2021, at 1, 5 (noting that while divorces could sometimes be
emotionally complicated, low-income divorce cases ordinarily involved straightforward legal
issues).
66. Paula Hannaford-Agor & Nicole Mott, Research on Self-Represented Litigation:
Preliminary Results and Methodological Considerations, 24 Just. Sys. J. 163, 171 (2003)
(noting that representation is a proxy for litigant wealth and Xinding that in “cases in which
both parties were self-represented . . . less than 7 percent resulted in a settlement,” indicating
that “[t]he appearance of an attorney for either party increased the settlement rate
substantially”).
67. Pamela Cardullo Ortiz, How a Civil Right to Counsel Can Help Dismantle
Concentrated Poverty in America’s Inner Cities, 25 Stan. L. & Pol’y Rev. 163, 188 (2014).
68. Greiner et al., supra note 65, at 5.
69. Id.
70. Ortiz, supra note 67, at 187 (using representation as a proxy for socioeconomic
status).
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of inequality, including housing instability, need for health care, need for
child or other familial care, and general lack of resources. The vast majority
of those seeking protective orders are experiencing poverty, which “limits
options, creates stressors and conditions that promote abuse, and makes it
more difcicult to escape abuse.”71 Wealthier people have better access to
resources to leave abusive relationships and secure safety, using nonjudicial
means to escape violence.72
The two remaining major subsets of “Relationships” cases are
probate/wills/intestate cases (14% of “Relationships” cases)73 and mental
health cases, which are cases where court intervention is sought to place or
keep an individual in mental health treatment (12% of “Relationships”
cases). Wills and probate matters also implicate socioeconomic status. Wills
themselves often cost over $1,000,74 and those from upper income
households are almost twice as likely to have a will.75 Without one, judicially
assigned executors administer estates—again increasing civil court control
over those without the resources needed to preempt court involvement.
This court involvement further compounds as parties initiate additional

71. Jane K. Stoever, Access to Safety and Justice: Service of Process in Domestic Violence
Cases, 94 Wash. L. Rev. 333, 387 (2019); see also Lisa Shannon, TK Logan & Jennifer Cole,
Intimate Partner Violence, Relationship Status, and Protective Orders: Does “Living in Sin”
Entail a Different Experience?, 22 J. Interpersonal Violence 1114, 1119 (2007) (Xinding that in
a sample of women with protective orders, 58% had annual incomes of less than $15,000).
72. Jane K. Stoever, Transforming Domestic Violence Representation, 101 Ky. L.J. 483,
531 (2012) (“Economic dependence is a substantial impediment to separating from an
abusive partner, but Xinancial relief in the form of child support, maintenance, housing
payments, and compensation for medical expenses, lost wages, and damaged property is
enumerated in only a small number of state statutes.”).
73. NCSC collection protocols and categories leave some ambiguity as to the underlying
problems within the Probate/Estate categories. It would be valuable, but is beyond our scope,
to pair local-level research with NCSC data to better understand who is using probate court
and how. See, e.g., David Horton, In Partial Defense of Probate: Evidence From Alameda
County, California, 103 Geo. L.J. 605, 624–27 (2014) (reporting a survey of cases in Alameda
County).
74. David Dierking, What’s the Average Cost of Making a Will?, Investopedia (Feb. 4,
2022), https://www.investopedia.com/ask/answers/033116/what-average-cost-makingwill.asp#:%7E:text=Drafting%20the%20will%20yourself%20is,it%20will%20be%20error
%2Dfree [https://perma.cc/BT84-LXQD].
75. Jeffrey M. Jones, Majority in U.S. Do Not Have a Will, Gallup (May 18, 2016),
https://news.gallup.com/poll/191651/majority-not.aspx
[https://perma.cc/786H-CDJG]
(“Of Americans whose annual household income is $75,000 or greater, 55% have a will,
compared with 31% of those with incomes of less than $30,000.”); Jeffrey M. Jones, Prevalence
of
Living
Wills
in
U.S.
Up
Slightly,
Gallup
(June
22,
2020),
https://news.gallup.com/poll/312209/prevalence-living-wills-slightly.aspx
[https://perma.cc/Q3VN-3J58] (Xinding that 59% of individuals in the top third of the income
distribution have living wills, compared to 28% in the lowest third).
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litigation, especially over assets76 and guardianship.77 Appointed
guardianship also implicates socioeconomic status. Although courtappointed guardianship for those who have not executed power of attorney
is determined by mental capacity, impoverished elders are nearly cive times
more likely to receive court-appointed guardians than those living above
the poverty line.78 Guardianships are often the result of a lack of “resources
to pay for access to common alternatives to guardianship like help with
drafting powers of attorney.”79 For older adults in poverty, “[a] bare
cupboard or home in disrepair may be attributed to a decline in mental
capacity due to age instead of other problems: poverty, physical disability,
lack of access to physical and mental healthcare, and a lack of a social safety
net.”80
2. Children. --A second category of cases, “Children,” occupies 15% of state civil court
dockets.81 These are all of the civil matters necessarily involving children.
As reclected in Table 1B, we exclude juvenile delinquency matters because,
while not ofcicially categorized as “criminal,” they are functionally closer to
criminal cases than they are to civil ones. Socioeconomic status signicicantly
affects court involvement among children, especially in child welfare
matters. “Families involved in the child welfare system overwhelmingly
draw from impoverished households.”82 For example, custody and
termination of parental rights deeply implicate poverty and racial
inequality. Higher rates of child abuse and neglect may emanate from the
hardships of low-socioeconomic status.83 Poor families are also
76. See, e.g., Andrew Stimmel, Note, Mediating Will Disputes: A Proposal to Add a
Discretionary Mediation Clause to the Uniform Probate Code, 18 Ohio St. J. Disp. Resol. 197,
197 (2002) (observing that legal attacks on a will can result in lengthy litigation and
explaining why mediation is a “particularly suitable method of dispute resolution for will
contests”).
77. See, e.g., Susan N. Gary, Mediation and the Elderly: Using Mediation to Resolve
Probate Disputes Over Guardianship and Inheritance, 32 Wake Forest L. Rev. 397, 413–16
(1997) (noting that guardianship and property disputes are two primary sources of probate
disputes).
78. Joseph Rosenberg, Poverty, Guardianship, and the Vulnerable Elderly, Geo. J. on
Poverty L. & Pol’y 315, 339 (2009) (Xinding, in a small sample, that 47% of those over sixtyXive with guardians fell below the poverty line, compared to 10.1% of the total population).
79. Nicole Shannon, Emily Miller & Emma Holcomb, Defending Older Clients in
Guardianship
Proceedings,
Mich.
Bar
J.,
Dec.
2020,
at
30,
32,
http://www.michbar.org/Xile/barjournal/article/documents/pdf4article4063.pdf
[https://perma.cc/TXS8-HWVW].
80. Id.
81. See infra Appendix, tbl.2. This is an estimated three million cases per year (15.45%
of 19,586,267 total civil justice needs cases per year). See supra note 59.
82. Karen Zilberstein, Parenting in Families of Low Socioeconomic Status: A Review
With Implications for Child Welfare Status, 54 Fam. Ct. L. Rev. 221, 222 (2016); see also
Dorothy Roberts, Shattered Bonds: The Color of Child Welfare 7–10, 74–92 (2002).
83. Mary Russell, Barbara Harris & Annemarie Gockel, Parenting in Poverty:
Perspectives of High-Risk Parents, 14 J. Child. & Poverty 83, 83–85 (2008); Zilberstein, supra
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disproportionately referred to child welfare,84 often inappropriately so as
the result of class bias.85 Moreover, the “physical, emotional, behavioral,
cognitive, and environmental problems” experienced by poor children can
“result in delinquent behavior or status offending,”86 especially in truancy
matters where poverty leads to absence or misbehavior at school.87 Poor
parents also “may turn to the court for help they could not otherwise
afford.”88 Together, these dynamics of racism and poverty land children and
their families in court.
The “Children” category captures cases that are theoretically distinct:
those that involve two private parties and those that involve the state. The
government is directly involved in more than half of the “Children” cases in
the following ways. First, child support matters where the custodial parent
receives government benecits and thus support payments go to the
government (these are approximately 40% of “Children” cases).89 Second,
note 82, at 222 (citing Leroy H. Pelton, The Continuing Role of Material Factors in Child
Maltreatment and Placement, 41 Child Abuse & Neglect 30, 30–31 (2015)).
84. Colleen E. Janczewski, The InXluence of Differential Response on Decision-Making in
Child Protective Service Agencies, 39 Child Abuse & Neglect 50, 51–52 (2015); Pelton, supra
note 83, at 35–36 (2015); Jacqueline Stokes & Glen Schmidt, Race, Poverty and Child
Protection Decision Making, 41 British J. Soc. Work 1105, 1107 (2011).
85. For example, bias may arise in custody disputes, divorce proceedings, or visitation
when reporting abuse or assessing parental behavior. See Alice M. Hines, Kathy Lemon, Paige
Wyatt & Joan Merdinger, Factors Related to the Disproportionate Involvement of Children of
Color in the Child Welfare System: A Review and Emerging Themes, 26 Child. & Youth Serv.
Rev. 507, 521–24 (2004) (“Differential treatment based on ethnicity and/or [socioeconomic
status], is clearly a factor that may likely contribute to the disproportionate representation of
children of color in the [child welfare system].”); Pelton, supra note 83, at 34 (Xinding bias
where child welfare workers report abuse on the basis of dirty houses or other indicia of low
income, not the parenting itself).
86. Katherine Hunt Federle, Child Welfare and the Juvenile Court, 60 Ohio St. L.J. 1225,
1237 (1999). Status offenses are acts that are not criminal and only subject to penalty because
of the individual’s age. This includes things like violating curfew, being repeatedly absent from
school, or being present in spaces in ways that have been labeled “loitering.” See David J.
Steinhart, Status Offenses, 6 Future Child. 86, 86 (1996).
87. See Steinhart, supra note 86, at 94.
88. Federle, supra note 86, at 1244.
89. See Jacquelyn L. Boggess, Ctr. for Fam. Pol’y & Prac., Low-Income and Never-Married
Families: Service and Support at the Intersection of Family Court and Child Support Agency
Systems
9
(2017),
https://cffpp.org/wpcontent/uploads/CFFPPpaper_BOGGESS_forscreen.pdf
[https://perma.cc/Z2X4-FK98]
(highlighting the problems inherent to the U.S. child support system due to racial inequity and
disparities in poverty and unemployment); Tonya L. Brito, Fathers Behind Bars: Rethinking
Child Support Policy Toward Low-Income Noncustodial Fathers and Their Families, 15 J.
Gender, Race & Just. 617, 625 (2012) (describing the distribution scheme for child support
established by the 1984 amendments to the Child Support Act); Tonya L. Brito, The Child
Support Debt Bubble, 9 U.C. Irvine L. Rev. 953, 965 (2019) (“[I]n the majority of IV-D contempt
cases, the noncustodial parents’ circumstances involve unemployment and below poverty
wages.”); Eleanor Pratt, Child Support Enforcement Can Hurt Black, Low-Income,
Noncustodial
Fathers
and
Their
Kids,
Urb.
Inst.
(June
16,
2016),
https://www.urban.org/urban-wire/child-support-enforcement-can-hurt-black-lowincome-noncustodial-fathers-and-their-kids [https://perma.cc/75QM-PXY3] (“Studies have
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dependency cases involving abuse, neglect, and termination of parental
rights have the relevant child welfare agency as a party (these are
collectively 16% of “Children” cases).90 An additional collection of cases may
involve the government but in a less direct capacity, such as paternity
matters (fourteen percent of “Children” cases) where the government
requires a cinding of paternity to justify a child support case.91 The cases
that involve solely private parties include adoption, custody, paternity,
visitation, and guardianship and support where the government’s child
welfare role is not involved.

estimated that low-income, noncustodial fathers are disproportionately black, and . . . black
men are more likely to be poor, face labor market discrimination, and have more limited social
networks to help them stay employed and able to pay their child support orders.”). For a
qualitative study on how fathers are affected by Xinancial support requirements, see Elizabeth
Clary, Pamela Holcomb, Robin Dion & Kathryn Edin, Off. of Plan., Rsch. & Eval., Providing
Financial Support for Children: Views and Experiences of Low-Income Fathers in the PACT
Evaluation 3–4 (2017), https://www.mathematica.org/publications/providing-Xinancialsupport-for-children-views-and-experiences-of-low-income-fathers
[https://perma.cc/VD4N-NMYW].
90. In re Smith, 601 N.E.2d 45, 55 (Ohio 1991) (“A termination of parental rights is the
family law equivalent of the death penalty in a criminal case.”); see also Michele R. Forte, Note,
Making the Case for Effective Assistance of Counsel in Involuntary Termination of Parental
Rights Proceedings, 28 Nova L. Rev. 193, 193–94 (2003) (calling the termination of parental
rights “the ‘death penalty’ of juvenile law” as “[i]t constitutes a direct interference by the state
into a parent’s ‘essential’ right to conceive and raise one’s child” (Xirst quoting Appellant’s
Initial Brief on the Merits at 3, N.S.H. v. Fla. Dep’t of Child. & Fam. Servs., 843 So. 2d 898 (Fla.
2003) (No. SC02-261), 2002 WL 32131297; then quoting Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390,
399 (1923))). A 2020 study analyzed data from children in the U.S. foster care system since
2000. The study found that “African American children are 2.4 times more likely than White
children to experience the termination of parental rights.” Christopher Wildeman, Frank R.
Edwards & Sara WakeXield, The Cumulative Prevalence of Termination of Parental Rights for
U.S. Children, 2000–2016, 25 Child Maltreatment 32, 33 (2020). Additionally, the study
provides that “[t]ermination of parental rights . . . is likely far more consequential because it
signals the end of attempts to reunify parents and children and . . . leads to immediate
attempts to place children in adoptive homes.” Id.; see also Child.’s Bureau, Child Welfare
Practice to Address Racial Disproportionality and Disparity 1–23 (2021),
https://www.childwelfare.gov/pubpdfs/racial_disproportionality.pdf
[https://perma.cc/8M6T-YZX8] (providing an “overview on the issue of racial
disproportionality and disparity in the child welfare system and the factors that contribute to
the problem”).
91. See Stacy Brustin, More Than a Witness: The Role of Custodial Parents in the IV-D
Child Support Process, 26 Child.’s Legal Rts. J. 37, 37–39 (2006) (discussing the federal
requirement that states mandate that recipients assign any right to beneXits to the state who
then enforces the obligation on the noncustodial parent); Paula Roberts, In the Frying Pan and
in the Fire: AFDC Custodial Parents and the IV-D System, 18 Clearinghouse Rev. 1407, 1408
(1985) (“This cooperation [between the IV-D agent and the custodial parent] includes
identifying and locating the absent parent, establishing paternity, and obtaining support or
any other payments due . . . . [T]he parent may be required to go to the IV-D ofXice for
appointments . . . , appear as a witness . . . and provide information under oath.”); Paternity,
Legal
Assistance
Ctr.,
https://legalassistancecenter.org/get-help/paternity/
[https://perma.cc/632D-ZBZS] (last visited Feb. 10, 2022) (outlining the prerequisite
of paternity and its process before the court can order child support from the father).
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Together, “Relationships” and “Children,” which collectively capture
social needs of families, make up about 46% of state civil court dockets each
year in our data.92
3. Housing. --A third category of cases, “Housing,” is 15% of state civil court
dockets.93 These are landlord–tenant matters, including eviction, and
mortgage foreclosure cases. This category is likely an undercount of the
number of people facing eviction or foreclosure, as it does not capture those
housing debt-related cases that appear on small claims dockets.94
Collectively, the substance of these cases involves either people at risk
of losing their homes or people trying to improve the conditions of their
homes. Eviction and foreclosure as causes and consequences of economic
inequality are well-documented.95 This research demonstrates, and current
policy conversations echo, how interwoven housing instability is into the
fabric of social inequality in this country. Similarly, disparate involvement
in housing cases reclects the country’s racial inequality and corresponding
starker social needs.96 Housing conditions cases—where tenants are trying
to get landlords to make repairs—are similarly concentrated among low92. See infra Appendix, tbl.2. This is an estimated nine million cases per year (45.73% of
19,586,267 total civil justice needs cases per year). See supra note 59.
93. See infra Appendix, tbl.2. This is an estimated three million cases per year (14.95%
of 19,586,267 total civil justice needs cases per year). See supra note 59.
94. Housing data suggest as many as Xive million people a year are subject to eviction.
Housing Loss in the United States: Our National Rankings and Maps, New Am.,
https://www.newamerica.org/future-land-housing/reports/displaced-america/housingloss-in-the-united-states-our-national-rankings-and-maps/ [https://perma.cc/KD3L-KMFR]
(last visited Feb. 10, 2022) (pointing out that U.S. housing data is poor and incomplete but
providing a 2014–2016 average rate with available data); see also National Estimates:
Eviction in America, Eviction Lab (May 11, 2018), https://evictionlab.org/nationalestimates/ [https://perma.cc/8HTR-42DJ] (showing data that the number, but not
necessarily the rate, of evictions has increased, though their sample excludes California and
New York).
95. Regarding eviction, see Monica Bell & Matthew Desmond, Housing, Poverty, and the
Law, 11 Ann. Rev. L. & Soc. Sci. 15, 19 (2015) (suggesting that “[t]enant screening on the basis
of previous evictions and convictions” may “foster inequality”); Matthew Desmond, Eviction
and the Reproduction of Urban Poverty, 118 Am. J. Socio. 88, 91 (2012) (listing negative
consequences of eviction); Matthew Desmond & Carl Gershenson, Housing and Employment
Insecurity Among the Working Poor, 63 Soc. Probs. 46, 60 (2016) (“Forced removal from
housing may serve as a crucial turning point in the lives of poor working families, with
eviction leading to job loss, which in turn can result in durable earnings losses and nontrivial
negative health outcomes.”). Regarding foreclosure, see Antwan Jones, Gregory D. Squires &
Cynthia Ronzio, Foreclosure Is Not an Equal Opportunity Stressor: How Inequality Fuels the
Adverse Health Implications of the Nation’s Financial Crisis, 37 J. Urb. Affs. 505, 519–20
(2015) (concluding that “foreclosures, health, and income inequality are intricately
interrelated”); Gregory D. Squires, Inequality, Advocacy, and the Foreclosure Crisis, 8 J.
Applied Soc. Sci. 85, 87 (2014) (asserting that “[c]hanges in home equity largely account for
the spike in wealth inequality” in recent years); see also supra notes 1, 32 & 45.
96. For empirical studies capturing stark racial disparities in housing cases, see supra
note 1.
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income tenants.97 This, too, is both a cause and consequence of inequality
rooted in the country’s history of segregation and health inequities.98
4. Small Claims (Including Debt Collection). --A fourth category is difcicult to parse: “Small Claims” cases. This is 19%
of the state civil court dockets and is a mix of tort, contract, and property
matters.99 This proportion varies by state, and there is limited data
disaggregating these case types.100
What we do know suggests that “Debt Collection” matters dominate
this part of state civil courts. The limited data suggest that “Small Claims”
dockets are roughly 40–60% “Debt Collection” matters, involving a
corporate debt buyer suing a low-income individual, with some additional
meaningful proportion including landlord–tenant disputes over payment of
rent or return of security deposits.101 We can extrapolate two things from
97. James Krieger & Donna L. Higgins, Housing and Health: Time Again for Public Health
Action, in Urban Health: Readings in the Social, Built, and Physical Environments of U.S. Cities
101, 106 (H. Patricia Hynes & Russ Lopez eds., 2009); see also David E. Jacobs, Environmental
Health Disparities in Housing, 101 Am. J. Pub. Health 115, 116 (2011) (“Clearly, the prevalence
rates [of people living in moderately substandard housing] are higher among racial and ethnic
minorities . . . .”).
98. See Dayna Bowen Matthew, Edward Rodrigue & Richard V. Reeves, Time for Justice:
Tackling Race Inequalities in Health and Housing, Brookings (Oct. 19, 2016),
https://www.brookings.edu/research/time-for-justice-tackling-race-inequalities-in-healthand-housing/ [https://perma.cc/BU2K-DFVB] (describing the housing disparities’ negative
consequences and disproportionate effect on Black families).
99. See infra Appendix, tbl.2. This is an estimated four million cases per year (18.92% of
19,586,267 total civil justice needs cases per year). See supra note 59.
100. The only (near) national report, using 2013 data, is Paula Hannaford-Agor, Ct. Stat.
Project, The Landscape of Civil Litigation in State Courts: Examining Debt Collection,
Landlord/Tenant
and
Small
Claims
Cases
(2019),
https://www.ncsc.org/__data/assets/pdf_Xile/0022/26671/caseload-highlights-examinintdebt-collection.pdf [https://perma.cc/W8LK-ACAJ]. In addition, there are a few state- and
city-level reports. See Ricardo Lillo, Access to Justice and Small Claims Courts: Supporting
Latin American Civil Reforms Through Empirical Research in Los Angeles County, California,
43 R. Ch. D. 955, 973 (2016); Bruce Zucker & Monica Her, The People’s Court Examined: A
Legal and Empirical Analysis of the Small Claims Court System, 37 Univ. S.F. L. Rev. 334, 335
n.121 (2003) (noting that in 2000, Ventura County had a population of 742,000, making it the
twelfth most populous county in California); Jennifer Clendening & Katie Martin, Pew
Charitable Trs., How Philadelphia Municipal Court’s Civil Division Works: Small Claims Cases
Can Have a Big Impact on City Residents’ Lives, (2021), https://www.pewtrusts.org//media/assets/2021/02/philadelphia_municipal_courts_civil_division_works.pdf
[https://perma.cc/374R-WNRT]; see also Arthur Bestf, Deborah Zalesne, Kathleen Bridges &
Kathryn Chenoweth, Peace, Wealth, Happiness and Small Claim Courts: A Case Study, 21
Fordham Urb. L.J. 343, 360–62 (1994); Suzanne Elwell & Christopher Carlson, Comment, The
Iowa Small Claims Court: An Empirical Analysis, 75 Iowa L. Rev. 433, 489 (1990); Hynes, supra
note 54, at 41–42; Mary Spector & Ann Baddour, Collection Texas-Style: An Analysis of
Consumer Collection Practices in and out of the Courts, 67 Hastings L.J. 1427, 1429–32 (2016).
101. Hynes, supra note 54, at 49 (estimating that in Virginia actions seeking the payment
of money account for approximately 60% of civil Xilings); Mary Spector, Debts, Defaults and
Details: Exploring the Impact of Debt Collection Litigation on Consumers and Courts, 6 Va. L.
& Bus. Rev. 257, 273 (2011) (Xinding that in Texas “suits on debt” accounted for 43.8% of civil
cases Xiled in county courts statewide).
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the available data. First, the dearth of “Small Claims” data means the
“Housing” proportion reported above does not include “Small Claims” cases
and thus is likely an undercount.
Second, we can piece together a view of “Debt Collection” matters using
“Small Claims” and other case types that reveals “Debt Collection” matters
are as big a part—if not bigger—of state civil court business as
“Relationships,” “Children,” and “Housing.” About 5% of the overall docket
(that is, more than half of contract cases) are explicitly identicied as “Debt
Collection” matters.102 If we combine these cases and the very rough
estimates of “Small Claims” dockets, “Debt Collection” matters (excluding
housing-related debt collection) are in the range of 15% of state civil court
dockets.103 If we include housing-related debt collection, this grows to about
24% of state civil court business.104 As other research has shown, these
cases are closely related to inequality.105
5. The Rest of Civil Justice Needs Cases. --The remaining approximately one-third of state civil court dockets is
spread among many case types, none constituting more than 10% of civil
justice needs cases. Among these cases is a fourth category of cases:

102. In NCSC data, this is called “Seller/Plaintiff” contract cases. See infra Appendix, tbl.2.
This is an estimated one million cases per year (5.06% of 19,586,267 total civil justice needs
cases per year). See supra note 59.
103. See infra Appendix, tbl.2. This is an estimated three million cases per year
(combining 50% of small claims cases with seller/plaintiff cases). See infra Appendix, tbl.2.
We note recent scholarship with different estimates of debt collection matters. One repeated
statistic is that there are eight million debt collection cases a year in the United States. See
Arbel, supra note 54, at 130; Wilf-Townsend, supra note 6 (manuscript at 50). The eight
million Xigure arises from applying proportional Xindings from a single state sample to
national caseload data to estimate totals, resulting in a blunter estimate than ours. See Arbel,
supra note 54, at 131 n.42 (applying Hynes and Spector’s 40–60% estimate to NCSC total of
Xifteen million civil cases per year).
104. If we also include eviction for nonpayment of rent (“landlord tenant unlawful
detainer”) cases, this balloons to 23% of civil justice needs and approximately Xive million
cases per year. Note that this estimate may not fully capture eviction matters that appear on
small claims dockets, which other data suggest could add another one million cases per year.
See Ashley Gromis, Princeton Univ. Eviction Lab, Eviction: Intersection of Poverty, Inequality,
and
Housing
5
(2019),
https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wpcontent/uploads/sites/22/2019/05/GROMIS_Ashley_Paper.pdf [https://perma.cc/T3N7BL9R]; see also Jenifer Warren, Pew Charitable Trs., How Debt Collectors Are Transforming
the Business of State Courts 6, 8 (2020), https://www.pewtrusts.org//media/assets/2020/06/debt-collectors-to-consumers.pdf [https://perma.cc/HLJ2-4JMP].
105. See Pamela Foohey, Dalié Jimé nez & Christopher K. Odinet, The Debt Collection
Pandemic, 11 Calif. L. Rev. Online 222, 225–27 (2020) (noting that “income inequality and
depressed wages have exacerbated people’s inability to accumulate any meaningful savings”
such that they have turned to consumer credit for “unexpected emergency expense[s]”);
Spector, supra note 101, at 273–74 (noting reports from Dallas County and other jurisdictions
Xinding that “civil litigation [comprising debt collection claims] is concentrated in cities and
counties with signiXicant minority populations, lower median income, and lower home
ownership”).
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“Contract” cases, making up 8% of the docket overall.106 As discussed above,
this category has meaningful variation within it for our purposes, with
about half of “Contract” cases being “Debt Collection” matters.107 An
additional 8% of state civil court cases are miscellaneous appeals from
administrative and limited jurisdiction courts.108 These are not appeals of
otherwise counted cases but rather cases that are appealed from these
miscellaneous subsidiary courts directly to the state civil trial court. A cifth
category is torts, which is 2% of the docket and captures the full range of
intentional torts, malpractice, and other torts.109 Two-thirds of these
matters are automobile related torts.110 Finally, tax matters (1%),
remaining non-housing property matters (0.5%), and employment matters
(0.1%) round out the dockets.111
These data describe trial courts, and there are appellate state courts in
each jurisdiction. However, state appellate courts are largely insulated from
the matters we describe above. This is due to the nature of appellate
proceedings: Appellate courts receive predetermined facts in a written
record and have almost no interaction with litigants. It is also because the
overwhelming number of state civil trial matters involve lawyerless
litigants who do not appeal. As we hope to pursue in future work, this means
that these matters—the individual cases but also the collective substance of
these cases—never make it to the appellate courts.112 We note that, in the
same way trial courts rest on assumptions about dispute resolution,
appellate courts rest on a corollary set of assumptions about institutional
design that do not hold true.
106. See infra Appendix, tbl.2.
107. See infra Appendix, tbl.2.
108. See infra Appendix, tbl.2. This is an estimated one and a half million cases per year
(8.1% of 19,586,267 total civil justice needs cases per year). See supra note 59.
109. See infra Appendix, tbl.2. This is an estimated 440,000 cases per year (2.25% of
19,586,267 total civil justice needs cases per year). See supra note 59.
110. See infra Appendix, tbl.2.
111. See infra Appendix, tbl.2. Tax is an estimated 260,000 cases per year; Property an
estimated 94,000 cases per year; and Employment an estimated 18,000 per year (1.33%,
0.48%, and 0.09% of 19,586,267 total civil justice needs cases per year, respectively). See
supra note 59.
112. See Carpenter et al., “New” Civil Judges, supra note 22, at 273–74 & n.103 (2018)
(noting that “cases involving pro se parties are unlikely to be appealed”); Llezlie L. Green,
Wage Theft in Lawless Courts, 108 Calif. L. Rev. 1303, 1336 (2019) (explaining that it is
unreasonable to expect a pro se litigant in small claims court to engage successfully in the
process of “crafting a compelling narrative and case theory . . . , particularly where the litigant
must use a narrative process to educate the judge about various statutory legal
protections”);Sabbeth, Housing Defense as the New Gideon, supra note 7, at 85 (“[T]enants
who are represented are three, six, ten, or even nineteen times more likely than pro se tenants
to prevail.”); Sabbeth & Steinberg, supra note 2 (manuscript at 55–56); Colleen F. Shanahan,
Anna E. Carpenter & Alyx Mark, Can a Little Representation Be a Dangerous Thing?, 67
Hastings L.J. 1367, 1376 (2016) (pointing out the risks of a lack of legal representation of less
resourced litigants in the form of “second-class legal assistance” and lacking “the beneXit of
law reform”).
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6. Quantifying Cases With Social Needs. --Using these civil case types based on the nature of people’s problems,
we categorize cases as “social needs presented” and “underlying social
needs” cases. In some types of cases, the social need is squarely presented
in the legal system’s decinition of a case. For example, an eviction matter is
plainly about whether a person remains in housing. Housing is plainly a
social need. An eviction matter can also be—though it is not always—about
a landlord needing cinancial stability. This additional social need reinforces
our categorization. Or a sister seeking to place a brother under compulsory
mental health care is plainly seeking health (and familial) care. Thus, we can
identify these cases as ones in which social needs are presented in state civil
courts. For some case types, we can imagine a range of problems, some
presenting social needs and some not. Thus, we categorize each subcategory
of case in Table 2 as presenting a social need, not presenting a social need,
or a mix. Our categorization yields a low estimate of 31% and a high
estimate of 90% of state civil court cases in our data presenting a social
need.113
Other cases require a deeper understanding of both the substantive law
and the goings-on in the courtroom to identify a social need. For example, a
domestic violence protective order case as decined by the existing legal
system is about two people with a relationship in conclict involving violence.
There may not be an obvious social need presented in the case type but, as
we discuss using qualitative data below, just below the surface we can
identify social needs such as housing, health care, and child care. In another
example, a defendant in a debt collection action is on the face of the case
defending against a contract claim. However, one can easily imagine a case
where the facts reveal that the debt in question is a high interest, high fee
payday loan that the defendant needed to pay her family’s expenses
between paychecks.114 In this type of case, we then see social needs such as
child care, housing support, or better wages related to the defendant’s
contractual liability. We label these “underlying social needs” cases.
Adding the second layer of categorization to the cirst, the proportion of
state civil cases that include social needs ranges from 46% to 95% of the
cases. Thus, even with our most conservative estimates, 46% of state civil
dockets (or roughly ten million cases per year) present social needs to state
civil courts. This is the equivalent of thirty-cive times the average civil
docket of the federal courts.115

113. See infra Appendix, tbl.2.
114. See, e.g., Aimee Picchi, Payday Loans Are Landing People in Jail, CBS News (Feb. 20,
2020),
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/payday-loans-dickensian-system-is-landingborrowers-in-jail-group-says/ [https://perma.cc/TJK9-HZ7J].
115. It is worth pausing to note the comparison with federal courts. As Table 3 shows,
24% of federal court cases are tort actions, 9% are contracts, 3% are property disputes, and
64% are actions falling under federal statutes (with the bulk of statutory actions being
prisoner petitions (20%) and civil rights actions (14%)).
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Social Needs in the Courtroom

While caseload data illuminate the volume of social needs that arise in
state civil courts, what happens inside these courts illustrates the depth of
the mismatch between people’s needs and courts designed for dispute
resolution. Our own mixed-methods, multijurisdictional study of state civil
courts sheds further light on how state civil courts distort litigants’ social
needs into narrow legal disputes requiring judicially led resolution.116
These data capture courtroom observations of 350 hearings as well as
interviews with judges and other actors in those courtrooms. These data are
drawn from three jurisdictions we refer to as Centerville, Townville, and
Plainville.117 Qualitative analysis reveals that many of these disputes
constitute “presented” or “underlying” social needs cases.
Our study focused on protective order cases, i.e., domestic violence,
stalking, and harassment. These cases have a number of generalizable
characteristics to the broader state civil caseload. Parties are generally
unrepresented, as they are across state civil courts.118 The law in these cases
is relatively static, and informal procedure abounds.119 Though
conventional academic wisdom about civil courts is that the trial is
“disappearing,”120 the opposite is true in state civil courts. The bulk of casedispositive interactions between largely lawyerless litigants and the courts
occur inside courtrooms, including in the cases in our study.121 Finally, there

116. We discuss the details and methodology of this study in Carpenter et al., Judges in
Lawyerless Courts, supra note 8 (manuscript at 21–26); Steinberg et al., Judges and
Deregulation, supra note 9, at 1327–28.
117. “The three jurisdictions in our study vary economically, demographically, and
politically. Centerville is a relatively wealthy, politically liberal, and diverse urban center with
appointed judges. Townville is also urban, politically liberal, and diverse, with a very high
poverty rate, a history of economic stagnation and appointed judges. Plainville is majority
white, politically moderate, and sits in a Xiscally and socially conservative state where social
and government services of all kinds are under-funded, including the courts.” Carpenter et al.,
Judges in Lawyerless Courts, supra note 8 (manuscript at 22).
118. Id. (manuscript at 4).
119. Id. (manuscript at 3 n.4).
120. Carpenter et al., “New” Civil Judges, supra note 22, at 274; Marc Galanter, The
Hundred-Year Decline of Trials and the Thirty Years War, 57 Stan. L. Rev. 1255, 1255 (2005);
Marc Galanter, The Vanishing Trial: An Examination of Trials and Related Matters in Federal
and State Courts, 1 J. Empirical Legal Stud. 459, 459–60 (2004).
121. Herbert M. Kritzer, The Trials and Tribulations of Counting “Trials”, 63 DePaul L.
Rev. 413, 430 (2013); Shanahan, Keys to the Kingdom, supra note 23, at 217 (“In state civil
and administrative courts, the hearing—the in-person interaction that occurs between selfrepresented litigants and judges in the courtroom—is the focal point of the justice
system . . . .”); Jessica K. Steinberg, Informal, Inquisitorial, and Accurate: An Empirical Look at
a Problem-Solving Housing Court, 42 Law & Soc. Inquiry 1058, 1060 (2017) [hereinafter
Steinberg, Informal, Inquisitorial, and Accurate] (offering evidence that the inquisitorial
procedures in the Housing Conditions Court in the District of Columbia “have the potential to
contribute to accurate outcomes for tenants”).
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is some, but uneven, assistance for parties outside the courtroom, including
efforts at negotiated resolutions.122
Protective order law generally requires evidence of (1) an existing
relationship between the parties, (2) a previous incident of violence or fear
of violence, and (3) an ongoing fear of harm.123 These cases are plainly built
on a dispute resolution construct, yet the issues that appear in our data go
far beyond this substantive law. These include child custody and support
between parents as well as among other family members, child welfare
proceedings involving the state and one or both parents, elder care and
estate concerns, housing instability, mental health care, addiction,
immigration law, career licensing, criminal law matters, and reentry and
probation matters. These issues were not presented in the courtroom as
collateral but were intertwined in the evidence and relief sought in the
course of the protective order cases. We begin in this section with how
social needs are presented in the courtrooms in our data. We save courts’
reactions to these needs as distinct analysis in the following section.
We saw numerous cases where an underlying issue is money to
support children, including paying for housing, between parents who do not
live together. For example, in one case, parents cross-ciled for protective
orders against each other after a long history of arguments over custody of
their child and who paid particular expenses. Each party alleged physical
violence by the other during arguments over money, in amounts like cifty
dollars for a babysitter.124 This is an example of our “underlying social need”
category where we can plainly observe that litigants have underlying social
needs that are broader and deeper than the bounds of the legally
constructed dispute. Here, those needs might include accessible and
affordable child care, higher wages, or employment hours compatible with
parenting.
There were a range of cases about caring for family members beyond
minor children, including elder care, and the associated cinancial burdens.
For example, one case involved a petitioner grandmother, her nonparty
granddaughter, and a respondent grandson. The grandson had used the
grandmother’s funds to pay for repairs to her home, made her stay at his
home so he could care for her, and reimbursed himself with the
grandmother’s funds to pay for costs of housing her.125 The granddaughter
actively participated in the hearing in support of her grandmother. Again,
the legal system constructed these parties’ problems as about a dispute
between a grandmother and her grandson. Yet if we look beyond the rigid
construct of the legal dispute, we see social needs, including accessible and
affordable elder care and affordable housing.
122. Carpenter et al., Judges in Lawyerless Courts, supra note 8 (manuscript at 4);
Carpenter et al., “New” Civil Judges, supra note 23, at 257–61, 277–78.
123. Carpenter et al., Judges in Lawyerless Courts, supra note 8 (manuscript at 27).
124. Notes of Hearing 7, Townville (Judge 4).
125. Notes of Hearing 23, Townville (Judge 2).
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The data also show cases with roommates presenting disputes over
rent or disagreements about their living situation. One particularly
complicated example is a case where a likely mentally ill respondent
illegally sublet one of her bedrooms to the petitioner. When the petitioner
learned of his invalid lease and contacted the actual landlord to protect
himself, the respondent tried to lock him out of the apartment, and there
was a physical altercation. The respondent was arrested and remained
incarcerated (due to inability to post bail) at the time of the civil court
hearing on the protective order.126 This case, while consistent with the
design of protective order cases due to the violent conclict between the
parties, nonetheless also reveals underlying social needs. Here, those social
needs may involve adequate mental health care, affordable housing, and
sufcicient income or social supports (including for the respondent to be
released from pretrial detention).
Across the cities we observed, addiction and mental health needs were
pervasive. For example, in one case a petitioner was recovering from cancer
surgery and her respondent brother, who was addicted to drugs, broke into
her home and assaulted her while looking to steal her pain medication. After
the sister reported the robbery and assault to the police, the brother called
the sister’s doctor’s ofcice, supportive housing, and disability providers
trying to obtain another prescription, jeopardizing her benecits and
services.127 In another case, a grandmother sought a protective order
against her daughter who had been released from a mental health facility
and was plainly agitated in court. The grandmother’s core problem was that
her daughter kept coming to her house and behaving violently, which
jeopardized the grandmother’s visitation rights with her grandchildren.128
In each of these examples the parties had conclicts involving violence, and
the need for sufcicient addiction and mental health services are also
immediately apparent.
Though we do not have this depth of data across all case types in state
civil courts, other research illustrates underlying social needs in other types
of cases. For example, Professor Matthew Desmond’s research gives us the
story of Arleen and how a concluence of social needs brought her to eviction
court.129 As housing costs increased and welfare payments and public
housing assistance remained stagnant, Arleen had to devote the vast
majority of her welfare check to rent, leaving her with little money to
provide for her family or cope with emergent cinancial needs. Toward the
end of 2008, Arleen was at her fourth apartment since the beginning of the
year. After a welfare sanction for a missed appointment and expenses for a
friend’s funeral, she was $870 behind on rent, and her landlord ciled to evict
her. In another example, from a report about Philadelphia’s debt collection
126.
127.
128.
129.

Notes of Hearing 16, Townville (Judge 2).
Notes of Hearing 12, Townville (Judge 2).
Notes of Hearing 21, Plainville (Judge 1).
Matthew Desmond, Evicted: Poverty and ProXit in the American City 63, 94 (2016).
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docket, a 50-year-old Black woman with an annual income of $19,200 was
the defendant in two collection actions for credit card debt accrued when
she was hospitalized and lost her job, resulting in damaged credit and a lien
on her home.130
Taken together, the quantitative and qualitative data paint a picture of
state civil courts largely occupied with social needs and their consequences
rather than resolving private disputes. These social needs capture the range
of dimensions of inequality: cinancial means, housing, health care, and care
for children and family members. Further, when we look at particular
subcategories of cases, we see how these needs for social provision become
intertwined with other dynamics of American law and society.
For example, the relationship between social provision and policing of
Black families appears in state civil court dockets. As others have theorized,
the conclation of poverty with neglect is intertwined with racism—
especially perceptions of Black mothers—and drives state intervention
through the child welfare, foster care, and juvenile detention systems.131
Even more pointedly, these structures explicitly wield state power—
through state civil court proceedings—to control access to social provision.
As Professor Dorothy Roberts aptly describes, in the child welfare system
“[p]arents must often relinquish custody of their children to the state in
exchange for the services and benecits their families need.”132 The breadth
130. Reinvestment
Fund,
Debt
Collection
in
Philadelphia
18
(2021),
https://www.reinvestment.com/wpcontent/uploads/2021/03/ReinvestmentFund_2021_PHL-Debt-Collection.pdf
[https://perma.cc/G8T6-EYNJ].
131. Jessica Horan-Block & Elizabeth Tuttle Newman, Accidents Happen: Exposing
Fallacies in Child Protection Abuse Cases and Reuniting Families Through Aggressive
Litigation, 22 CUNY L. Rev. 382, 396 (2019) (“[P]oor parents of color who bring their young
babies and children to Bronx hospitals with certain injuries are often met with interrogation
rather than consolation and compassion. The[se] case anecdotes . . . describe parents
repeatedly being charged with abuse based exclusively on injuries that litigation reveals are
plausibly accidental.”); Dorothy E. Roberts, Prison, Foster Care, and the Systemic Punishment
of Black Mothers, 59 UCLA L. Rev. 1474, 1493 (2012) [hereinafter Roberts, Systemic
Punishment] (“Because they perceive black single mothers as incapable of providing adequate
supervision of their children, ofXicials believe they are justiXied in placing these children under
state control . . . . [S]tate ofXicials apply the myth of black maternal irresponsibility to justify
placing African American children in both juvenile detention and foster care.”); Dorothy E.
Roberts, The Racial Geography of Child Welfare: Toward a New Research Paradigm, 87 Child
Welfare 125, 126 (2008) (presenting a case study on the effects of the high involvement of
child welfare agencies in Black communities); Jane M. Spinak, ReXlections on a Case (of
Motherhood), 95 Colum. L. Rev. 1990, 2008 (1995) (arguing that conceptions of motherhood
are informed by racist policies and stereotypes which serve to demean Black women and cast
them as unXit mothers); Christina White, Federally Mandated Destruction of the Black Family:
The Adoption and Safe Families Act, 1 Nw. J.L. & Soc. Pol’y 303, 315 (2006) (arguing that Black
children are especially susceptible to state intrusion).
132. Dorothy E. Roberts, Criminal Justice and Black Families: The Collateral Damage of
Over-Enforcement, 34 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 1005, 1014 (2001) [hereinafter Roberts, Criminal
Justice and Black Families]; see also Wendy Bach, Prosecuting Poverty, Criminalizing Care, 60
Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 809, 814 (2019) (describing a Tennessee statute that created a crime “not
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of mass incarceration exacerbates these dynamics.133 In this part of state
civil courts’ work, the presence of government leads to regulation,
punishment, and violence rather than to litigants’ social needs being met.
In some of these cases dispute resolution is well-matched to the needs
of powerful parties. In such cases, state civil courts directly serve the
interests of wealthy parties in extracting or maintaining wealth, in conclict
with the litigant’s need for social provision. For example, the state civil
courts are an effective mechanism for debt collection companies to
maximize the value of their investments.134 Historical research suggests this
is an intentional feature of these courts’ design.135
Of course, there are social needs that we are not seeing in our data or
in courtrooms more generally because people do not conceptualize their
problems as legal problems and do not engage the courts with those
problems they do see as legal.136 Professor Sandefur’s work further
questions whether this small proportion of engagement with the court is
problematic or whether it reclects that problems we decine as legal are
better solved outside of court.137 Ultimately, this means that, despite state
civil courts drinking from a cire hose of social needs, the apparent needs are
only a subset of those present in society.
II. HOW COURTS RESPOND TO THE INSTITUTIONAL MISMATCH
“It weighed on me, but I kept thinking, ‘you’re a judge. That’s not your
part.’”138
Our interview data reclect that the judges, advocates, and other actors
involved in these dockets are well aware of litigants’ social needs and that
to punish or to exact retribution but to provide care to the defendants prosecuted for the
offense”). As we discuss below, in our data, Centerville has tied access to housing and other
resources to the presence of a protective order. See infra note 176.
133. See Roberts, Criminal Justice and Black Families supra note 132, at 1006 (“Because
most prison inmates are parents, incarceration breaks up families by depriving children of
their parents’ emotional and Xinancial support. Juvenile detention and imprisonment also
splinter families because they remove children from their homes, transferring custody from
the parents to the state.”).
134. Wilf-Townsend, supra note 6 (manuscript at 1, 15–16). Courts are not the only
branch of government susceptible to being well-suited to pursuing corporate Xinancial
interests. See, e.g., Liz Day, The TurboTax Trap: How the Maker of TurboTax Fought Free,
Simple Tax Filing (Mar. 26, 2013), https://www.propublica.org/article/how-the-maker-ofturbotax-fought-free-simple-tax-Xiling [https://perma.cc/399J-PGVM] (describing how
Intuit, the maker of TurboTax, has spent millions lobbying against free, simple, governmentXiled tax returns).
135. See Kellen Funk, Chapter 5: The Swearer’s Prayer: Oathtaking and Witness
Testimony
17
(May
12,
2020)
(unpublished
manuscript),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3599032 [https://perma.cc/HJ8S-CYW9] (discussing New York
State’s Field Code).
136. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
137. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
138. Interview with Judge 1, Plainville.
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the court’s dispute resolution design does not cit these needs. One judge put
it plainly: “So, we’d cind a lot of people in [protective order court] really
needed to be in [landlord–tenant], or sometimes, bills, cinancial planning, is
what they need, not family court.”139 An advocate drew the contrast
between the assumptions about these cases and the reality:
[Y]ou would think that literally every case in [protective order]
court was a man beating a woman with a bat, but that couldn’t be
further from the truth . . . . [T]hat’s not at all what we see in
[protective order] court. We’ve represented a sister vs. her
brother. We’ve represented an elderly parent, a grandmother vs. a
younger nephew who was trying to get the upper hand in probate
case. We’ve represented a tenant where the petitioner was an
abusive, mentally ill landlord.”140
When state civil courts are faced with social needs, they must respond
in some way. Our data show that these responses fall into four categories.
We discuss these categories to frame a deeper theoretical understanding of
the role of state civil courts and acknowledge that these categories raise
new questions. For example, how do these responses appear across
jurisdictions and case types? Why might one court avoid social needs while
another attempts to meet them? What disposes a court system to build new
institutions in the face of these needs? We hope future work will address
these questions.141
In the cirst type of response, courts avoid social needs presented by the
litigant. They either do this altogether or by shaping the needs to cit the
design of the legal system. This type of court response reveals the potential
for state civil courts to be violent actors in the face of the mismatch between
social need and dispute resolution. In the second category, courts try to
meet litigants’ social needs at the individual actor level. What this means in
the courtroom is not that courts are acting as agents of social provision in a
social welfare state, but rather that courts address the social needs of
litigants just enough to resolve the dispute as wedged into the institutional
design—and hopefully to keep litigants from returning to court again. The
third category is where courts develop informal procedures to address
social needs at an institutional level. A cinal category of court response is
where courts develop new institutions to meet social needs.

139. Interview with Judge 1, Centerville.
140. Interview with Court Actor 1, Centerville.
141. One particular area for further investigation is when statutes creating courts or
speciXic areas of jurisdiction acknowledge or allow for engagement with broader litigant
needs. For instance, a New York statute provides:
This act deXines the conditions on which the family court may intervene in the life
of a child, parent and spouse. Once these conditions are satisXied, the court is given
a wide range of powers for dealing with the complexities of family life so that its
action may Xit the particular needs of those before it. The judges of the court are
thus given a wide discretion and grave responsibilities.
N.Y. Fam. Ct. Act § 141 (McKinney 2022).

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4143712

34
A.

COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 0:1

Avoid Social Needs

When courts avoid the social needs that arise in the courtroom, despite
a litigant’s social need that is plainly within the frame of the case or revealed
by the underlying facts, the court hews to its design as a site of dispute
resolution. At a minimum, this means the litigant’s need is ignored and not
met. Sometimes the litigant’s need is distorted by dispute resolution so that
the outcome of the case is that the litigant needs more or different social
provision. In other cases, as we discuss below, the court’s avoidance leads
to the court imposing a violent outcome such as the loss of a home or a child.
In the protective order case brought by a grandmother against her
mentally ill daughter who was jeopardizing the grandmother’s visitation
discussed above, the grandmother tells the judge that what she wants is to
get her daughter into court-ordered treatment. The judge cuts off her
testimony, enters a protective order, and ends the hearing.142 In doing so,
the judge is avoiding the social need articulated by the grandmother and
hewing to the legal decinition of the dispute as decined by domestic violence
law. In another case, a mother seeks a protective order against a daughter
who keeps trying to break into her home to get food. The testimony reveals
that the daughter is mentally ill and addicted to drugs. In the mother’s
words, “Her mind is gone. She thinks she lived there. She can’t do it. She
hasn’t lived there since February.” The judge enters a protective order. In
response, the mother asks whether the daughter can go to treatment. The
judge tells her, “You can cile with [another court] to admit her to treatment,
but it’s going to be expensive. The police can bring her to crisis, maybe they
can care for her there. That’s the key word, crisis treatment.” The judge then
ends the hearing with the protective order in place.143 Despite explicitly
understanding the social need in each of these cases (here, mental health or
addiction care), the court proceeds with the matter as one of dispute
resolution.
Courts do not just avoid the need for social provision, they also
compound it by entering protective orders. Each of these petitioners
presents a respondent’s social need, requests some kind of social provision,
but each court avoids those needs and then adds a layer of risk of even more
punitive consequences for respondents’ behavior.144 In each of these cases,
by avoiding the underlying need of health care and imposing the legal
solution of a protective order, the court facilitates violent state action—

142. See Notes of Hearing 21, Plainville (Judge 1); supra note 128 and accompanying text.
143. Notes of Hearing 8, Townville (Judge 4).
144. There are also examples of cases where judges avoid the social need and decline to
enter protective orders. See Notes of Hearing 18, Centerville (Judge 1) (recounting
proceedings in which a petitioner sought, but was ultimately denied, a protective order
against his nephew who has uncontrolled schizophrenia and had violent outbursts while
living with him).
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here, the respective daughters are now subject to arrest and incarceration
if they violate the protective orders.145
In another example from our data, the plaintiff and respondent were
two women who reached an agreement to resolve the matter through a
mandatory prehearing mediation program.146 They appeared before the
judge to enter the corresponding order. The hearing is four minutes long:
Judge:
I see you’ve come to agreement which is good.
But it’s important that you stick with the
agreement. The court cinds that it has
jurisdiction, and that Respondent agrees
without admitting allegations to entry of this
order. For next year, don’t harass, assault,
threaten, or stalk. Also, Respondent shall
follow all treatment recommendations from
her mental health provider, including
medications. That is a critical component.
Judge:
(To Respondent) Is that your signature? Did
you sign it voluntarily?
Respondent:
Yes (speaks angrily).
Judge:
One last thing. I have no reason to believe you
have a gun but I must read this. [Judge reads
standard prohibition regarding possession of
cirearm].
Respondent:
(To Petitioner, while judge is speaking): See
what you do?
Judge:
(The Judge ignores the Respondent.) Any
questions?
Respondent:
No.
Judge:
I hope this order will help and that you’ll
continue to see your doctor and take your
meds.
In this jurisdiction, there is a required meeting with a mediator before
a hearing—a step generally perceived as an innovation that mitigates the

145. See Nat’l Ctr. on Prot. Ords. & Full Faith & Credit, Protection Order Violations Matrix
(2015),
https://www.bwjp.org/assets/documents/pdfs/ncpoffc-protection-orderviolations-matrix.pdf [https://perma.cc/5X93-BYTG] (summarizing consequences for
violations of protection orders in all Xifty states); see also Plain-Language Legal Information
for Victims of Abuse, WomensLaw.org, womenslaw.org [https://perma.cc/4JVE-YY97] (last
visited Mar. 3, 2022) (including an interactive legal information tool summarizing statutes in
each state).
146. Notes of Hearing 35, Centerville (Judge 1). Because the case is Xiltered through the
mediation program, we do not know how the parties presented their needs or case to the
court.
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rigidity of the adversarial system.147 Yet the litigants’ problems remained
social needs, and the court resolved them as a dispute. Even in a fourminute, perfunctory hearing to enter the agreed-upon resolution, the
mismatch between the social needs and the court’s design is stark. The
judge’s closing comment acknowledged the mismatch and the court’s choice
to hew to its dispute resolution design, even with an “alternative” resolution
procedure in place.
Our study site is not the exclusive context for courts avoiding social
needs. Eviction courts are classic examples. The most straightforward
version of this is when a tenant cannot pay rent because of insufcicient
income, and the housing court evicts the tenant.148 Other eviction causes of
action are for tenant behavior such as disruptive noise or cighting. These
cases reveal social needs including mental health care and caregiving
support in housing court. Where a court does not outright evict a tenant, the
case is often resolved by agreement where the tenant promises to comply
with certain additional cinancial or behavioral conditions. These outcomes
allow courts to avoid the social needs presented and, as Nicole Summers
shows, create an additional mechanism of control over tenants, often
leading to more “swift and certain” eviction.149 These cases distort litigants’
social needs, not by meeting and eliminating them but by compounding the
original needs by making the tenant more vulnerable to the violence of
eviction.
The examples above are ones where the litigants are private parties.
This type of distortion also occurs where the government is a party to a case.
For example, in the child welfare context, a mother may be defending an
action brought by the government for abuse or neglect because of the poor
living conditions of the family. In this circumstance, the mother needs better
housing (or other social provision that would allow her to afford better
housing) yet the dispute brought to court by the government is not to
comprehensively address the underlying social need.150 In cases where the
147. See Menkel-Meadow, supra note 24, at 36 (describing mediation as an
“[i]ntermediate space[] . . . without formal or complexly facilitated rules”); Jane Murphy,
Rethinking the Role of Courts in Resolving Family ConXlicts, 21 Cardozo J. ConXlict Resol. 625,
634–35 (2020) (describing the role of mediation in family law generally).
148. Sabbeth, Housing Defense as the New Gideon, supra note 7, at 64–66 (collecting
sources regarding underlying economic inequality of housing courts).
149. Nicole Summers, Civil Probation, 75 Stan. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2023) (manuscript at
7),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3897493
[https://perma.cc/7NAA-Z6QH].
Professor
Summers has shown how the outcomes of these cases are often settlements crafted to control
tenant behavior rather than resolution of disputes regarding the housing agreement. Id.; see
also Carolyn Reinach Wolf & Jamie A. Rosen, Alternatives to Eviction: Legal Remedies When
Faced With a Mentally Ill Tenant, 48 N.Y. Real Prop. L.J. 14, 15–17 (2020) (suggesting that
rather than evicting tenants who struggle with mental health—which can present problems
for both tenants and landlords—landlords pursue alternative options like guardianship,
assisted outpatient treatment, or temporary hospitalization and care).
150. See Maren K. Dale, Addressing the Underlying Issue of Poverty in Child-Neglect
Cases,
A.B.A.
(Apr.
10,
2014),
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/litigation/committees/childrens-
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government has an active role, the mismatch between dispute resolution
and social needs is even more complex because it is not just that
government services are inadequate, but rather that the government’s role
compounds the absence of social provision with a violent remedy, here the
loss of a child.
B.

Attempt to Meet Social Needs

A second category of court response to litigants’ social needs is to try
to meet those needs. For analytic clarity, this category captures when actors
connect litigants with resources but not when actors create new
institutional structures to provide those resources.
In our data, these attempts to meet social needs vary. One way judges
try to meet social needs is to not resolve the matter in their own court but
to instead send a litigant to a court the judge perceives as better able to meet
the litigant’s need. For example, judges can dismiss or stay the protective
order case and tell litigants to go to another court to address their needs,
including telling litigants to go to family court for custody matters,151 to
family court to force the co-parent into alcohol treatment,152 or to landlord–
tenant court.153 An example from our data is a case where the litigants were
roommates who got into a cistcight. The roommates had been placed
together by a social services program and each had underlying mental
health diagnoses and a history of housing instability.154 During the hearing,
the judge recognized these needs for social provision, stayed the case, and
referred each party to mental health treatment resources and a housing
counseling center to identify potential alternative housing. Setting aside the
procedural choice to stay the case, which we discuss below in the context of
informal procedure, this is a classic example of a state civil court actor trying
to meet a social need. The difference in these examples from those where
rights/articles/2014/addressing-underlying-issue-poverty-child-neglect-cases/
[https://perma.cc/F9G2-F4QA] (citing a Tennessee case in which the state brought an action
to terminate the parental rights of a poor family with a disabled mother and low-IQ father,
with a judge dissenting on the grounds that while the state should have custody, the parents’
rights should not have been terminated); see also Marta Beresin, Reporting Homeless Parents
for Child Neglect: A Case Study From Our Nation’s Capital, 18 UDC L. Rev. 14, 16 (2015) (“[T]he
D.C. Department of Human Services and Child and Family Services Agency’s policy of
reporting homeless families for neglect rather than assisting them with shelter or housing is
both Xinancially irresponsible and counter to the fundamental goals of the child welfare
system.”).
151. Notes of Hearing 7, Townville (Judge 4) (denying protective order); Notes of Hearing
14, Townville (Judge 2) (denying protective order and telling litigants “family issues need to
be resolved on the family division docket”).
152. Notes of Hearing 35, Plainville (Judge 1) (staying the protective order proceeding so
petitioner can Xile in family court).
153. Notes of Hearing 5, Townville (Judge 2) (“Let me tell you something. I’m not involved
with the landlord-tenant dispute. Let her come get her stuff. Don’t have contact. I’m not getting
involved in it. I’m dissolving both [protective orders].”).
154. Notes of Hearing 24, Townville (Judge 2).
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courts avoid social needs is that the judge is choosing not to impose the
dispute resolution design of protective order law on the social needs but
rather to only engage the underlying need.
Another variation is when judges tell litigants to try to access social
services or benecits outside the courts. For example, a judge denied a
protective order for a mother who was living in a shelter after leaving the
home where the father lived, telling her to cile for Temporary Assistance for
Needy Families and welfare benecits so that the government would then
seek child support from the father.155 This is particularly true in
jurisdictions like Centerville where funding ties access to housing, services,
and victim compensation to a party having a protective order.156 In this
circumstance, judges can attempt to meet social needs by granting a
protective order and informing litigants of the resources they can then
access. Finally, sometimes courts will directly order social provision. For
example, a judge entered a protective order for a sister against her brother
who is addicted to drugs and ordered the brother to complete a drug
treatment program.157 In these instances of courts attempting to meet social
needs, they introduce an element of state control that was not previously
present. While the brother in this instance now has access to drug
treatment, he also is subject to punishment––including cinancial penalty
and incarceration—should he fail to comply with the order. When courts try
to meet social needs, whether inside or outside the courts, they can
introduce an element of state control that was not previously present in a
way that is similar to critiques of the state as a party in civil matters.158
C.

Create Law or Procedure

A third response to the mismatch between social needs and dispute
resolution design is for individual actors to create informal law or
procedure to meet social needs. This is a diffuse phenomenon and captures
behavior that ranges from a court clerk’s behavior in an individual case to
informal practices shared among judges in the same court.159 What
distinguishes this phenomenon in state civil courts from traditional theories
of law development is that this phenomenon is unseen on a systemic level.
This is in part because of the limited development of written law in

155. Notes of Hearing 9, Townville (Judge 4).
156. Interview with Court Actor 3, Centerville.
157. Notes of Hearing 12, Townville (Judge 2).
158. See supra notes 131–133.
159. One of us has written about this “ad hoc judging” as a judicial coping mechanism for
resolving disputes in lawyerless courts. Steinberg, Adversary Breakdown, supra note 8, at
898–99; see also Pamela K. Bookman & David L. Noll, Ad Hoc Procedure, 92 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 767,
774 (2017) (“Ad hoc procedure overcomes problems that cannot be solved using the existing
procedural structures, and may be necessary to ensure that the civil justice system is able to
provide the ordinary desiderata of civil litigation in cases that defy customary judicial
management.”).
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lawyerless courts.160 For the purposes of this analysis, we are interested in
the subset of this informal law or procedure that shifts courts’ institutional
goal from dispute resolution to social provision.
Drawing on our data, one way courts do this is by shaping law to meet
litigant needs within the concines of dispute resolution. For example, a
protective order matter was brought by an uncle against a nephew with
newly diagnosed schizophrenia who had been violent with the uncle. After
a hearing and evidentiary cindings that the petitioner had met his burden,
the judge sua sponte added petitioner’s husband as a party to the protective
order. The husband had not sought such an order, had not presented
evidence in support of one, and the law regarding who could seek such an
order (based on the nature of the parties’ relationship, past incidents
between them, and fear of future harm) had not been engaged at all. Yet the
judge decided that the respondent’s mental illness was such that both the
uncle and his husband should be protected and implicitly created law to
provide for that.161
Judges also develop new remedies outside the written law to meet
litigant needs or disregard written law to the same end. For example, in one
case the judge declared, without any request or question from the
petitioner, “I’ll waive monetary relief because you don’t want contact,” yet
there is no decinition of these two remedies that makes them mutually
exclusive.162 In another case with cross-petitions by co-parents, the judge
asked the clerk in open court, “I want them to go to a custody parenting
seminar—can I do that if it’s a dismissal? Can I order that onto the Family
Division docket?” The clerk got on the phone, called someone else to ask the
same question, then told the judge that “they will put it in the system.” The
judge then dismissed the case and said “there’s an order to go to the custody
parenting seminar” and told the parties to go to the custody and support
ofcice in the courthouse.163 This example is distinct from a pure referral to
another court because this judge created jurisdictional law allowing a
remedy where, despite dismissing the case on one docket, the judge entered
an order on a different case between the parties on another judge’s docket.
In another matter involving a dispute between a grandmother and a
grandson over the costs of her care (which the grandson had taken from the
grandmother’s funds), the judge articulated a distinction between what he
“can” do: Ask the grandson to return all the money he took except for the
already paid for expenses. And then separately articulated what he “can’t”

160. Green, supra note 112, at 1307 (noting that much of the law actually applied in small
claims court is informal and diverges from the written statutes, and thus arguing for the
injection of legal standards); Sabbeth, Market-Based Law Development, supra note 11
(discussing the disproportionately limited development of law and precedent in “lower status
courts”).
161. Notes of Hearing 18, Centerville (Judge 1).
162. Notes of Hearing 12, Townville (Judge 2).
163. Notes of Hearing 26, Townville (Judge 2).

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4143712

40

COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 0:1

do: Consider what the expenses were and what should be returned.164 There
is no substantive law, evidentiary rule, or procedure that aligns with this
articulation by the judge; the judge simply created a new legal distinction.
At the end of the same hearing, after the judge decided not to issue a
protective order, the grandmother said she doesn’t want the grandson near
her, to which the judge responded, “[H]e’s on notice, you can call the cops.”
However, in the absence of a protective order, there is no legal remedy that
clows from calling the police. Though our data do not capture any
subsequent interactions with the police, one wonders whether the
grandmother ever tried to do this and whether the police in fact acted
consistent with the remedy suggested by the judge. Regardless, this is also
an example of courts as violent actors, where the judge’s articulated remedy
introduces the potential for police intervention and the grandson’s arrest,
even in the absence of a protective order, if the grandson comes to the
grandmother’s house.
Judges also explicitly create new procedure. As Professors Pamela
Bookman and David Noll have theorized, in contrast to traditional
procedure developed in advance of disputes by legislative action, ad hoc
procedure is developed in the midst of a matter in controversy to achieve
specicic outcomes.165 Our data are replete with examples of this behavior,
by judges but also occasionally by other actors.166 In the example of
roommates with mental health and housing needs discussed above, the
judge decided to stay the case for ninety days to allow the litigants to access
services.167 There is no law or procedure in this jurisdiction about a
continuance to seek social services, nor did the parties request a stay.
Nonetheless, the judge recognized that the litigants were less in need of
dispute resolution by the court and more in need of services outside the
court and improvised a procedure to accommodate.
In another example, a defendant had not been served with notice of the
protective order matter. In this jurisdiction, petitioners can ask the police
department to serve, and this petitioner had done so, but the police had not
accomplished service. As a result, even though the petitioner appeared for
her hearing, the judge could not proceed. Visibly frustrated by the ongoing
delays, the judge asked if the petitioner knew how to contact the defendant
and the petitioner said she had the defendant’s phone number. In open
court, and without any written procedure that allows such an approach to
service, the judge used her speakerphone to dial the defendant, who picked
up the phone:
Judge:
This is Judge [Two], we’re on the record in
[Townville] court. Are you aware of the
restraining order?
164.
165.
166.
167.

Notes of Hearing 23, Townville (Judge 2).
Bookman & Noll, supra note 159, at 767–68.
Steinberg et al., Judges and Deregulation, supra note 9, at 1316.
Notes of Hearing 24, Townville (Judge 2).
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Defendant:
Judge:
Defendant:
Judge:
Defendant:
Judge:
Defendant:
Judge:

Yes.
Are you aware you need to be in court?
I thought it was tomorrow . . . .
All I want to know is will you be in court?
YesAt 8:30 at [Townville] court.
Yes, I will be there.
We got no letters, nothing, none of it means
anything. Be here at 8:30. You’re served.
Then the judge hung up the phone.168 In addition to the sheer human
drama of this judge-created procedure, this example is remarkable because
this jurisdiction’s law does not allow for service by phone.
Our data also reveal ad hoc procedure created by a clerk or by the
judge’s reliance on a clerk’s advice, often in response to questions about
how to meet social needs. One variation on this is when clerks give
instructions to litigants off the record. For example, in Townville, the clerks
were trained specicically in protective order procedure in a way the judges
were not. They were also physically seated between the door to the
courtroom and the bench and litigant tables. As a matter of course, we
observed litigants approach clerks to ask questions and the clerks tell
litigants to adjust what they had written on a form or to go to a different
location for mediation or to access a service. On the record across the
jurisdictions in our study, judges would ask clerks what a procedural rule
was, and the clerks’ responses were not always in line with the law.169 A
related phenomenon appears in judges’ reliance on nonlawyer advocates in
court adjacent programs, which we discuss in a separate paper.170 For
example, a judge might interrupt a formal court hearing to “ask [an
advocate] . . . to call the [pro se] person and maybe have them come in and
amend something.”171
Another example in our data is in protective order cases with related
housing issues. Here, protective order judges in our data dispose of the
landlord–tenant matter without any law or procedure providing that a
protective order controls the housing question. In our data, this sometimes
happens without any inquiry as to whether there is a pending housing court

168. Notes of Hearing 13, Townville (Judge 2).
169. See Notes of Hearing 16, Townville (Judge 2) (waiving civil penalty on clerk’s
initiative and asking if there is anything else judge needs to do); Notes of Hearing 35, Plainville
(Judge 1) (relying on clerk’s statement that family court cases will be consolidated to stay
protective order matter). Interviews conXirmed that judges relied on clerks to make
procedural choices. Interview with Court Actor 3, Plainville.
170. Steinberg et al., Judges and Deregulation, supra note 9, at 1328 (“Judges are quietly
collaborating with a network of nonlawyer advocates who carefully curate protective
petitions, develop facts and evidence, counsel pro se petitioners, and inXluence the judge’s
performance in court and, presumably, the outcome of cases.”).
171. Interview with Court Actor 2, Plainville.
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matter.172 Judges are effectively creating law that allows their decisions to
preempt a housing court matter. This could be seen as avoiding a social need
by avoiding the underlying housing law questions and issues by summarily
disposing of the housing issue. It also could be seen as addressing a social
need by meeting an underlying housing need for one party.
D.

Create New Institutions

A cinal version of courts’ reactions to litigants’ needs is the most explicit
structural change: creating new institutions that attempt to provide for
social needs. This captures a range of institutional innovation, but the
hallmark is that it is court actors creating new institutions outside the
normal modes of dispute resolution.
Sometimes the new institution is adjacent to the courtroom. This is the
case in the protective order cases that are the subject of our study, where
domestic violence organizations operate as separate institutions but are
integrated into procedure in formal and informal ways. For example, in
Townville, before a petitioner can agree to dismiss a case, they must meet
with a domestic violence advocate to review information about protective
order procedure (a type of legal counseling) and domestic violence
generally (a type of social work counseling). Once this happens, the
petitioner appears before the judge who does a formal colloquy about
whether this counseling has happened. In this jurisdiction, the advocates
are judicial branch employees who themselves do not provide social
services but are robustly equipped to refer petitioners to outside
organizations and do so as a matter of course. They are the same parties
who assist petitioners in cilling out initial requests for protective orders at
the start of the process.173 Effectively, the state civil court in this jurisdiction
has built a new court structure within the judicial branch: an ofcice that
provides counseling and assistance within the civil process that petitioners
are required to engage with if they wish to achieve certain outcomes in the
dispute resolution process.
In Plainville, the domestic violence advocates are employees of a
separate nonprocit entity but have ofcices in the courthouse and are present
in the courtroom for every protective order hearing. The judges send
petitioners to them as a matter of course for assistance with their cases, and
the advocates explicitly understand their role to be to connect litigants with
172. An advocate for respondents in Centerville told us:
If I’m a landlord and I live with my tenant, I can just get a [protective order] and get
you out. It supersedes landlord tenant law . . . . it shouldn’t if there’s an active
landlord-tenant case. But unless the respondent brings it up and it is afXirmatively
raised, judge isn’t aware that there’s a landlord-tenant case. Judges only deal with
what’s before them and what they’ve been told by parties. So they just put the
[protective order] into effect and then the tenant has to get out.
Interview with Court Actor 1, Centerville.
173. Interview with Court Actor 1, Townville.
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social services.174 Here, advocates are separate from the court but litigants
likely do not perceive that distinction. And while formal procedure does not
require petitioners to engage with them, the judges’ instructions are
functionally a requirement.
In Centerville, the domestic violence advocates are a robust part of the
judicial branch, actively provide social services, and are also legal advocates
before the court on particular cases and on systemic matters.175 This
jurisdiction is the most complete exercise of institution building as the new
institution wields meaningful power in the court ecosystem. This is true in
direct interactions with petitioners, where the adjacent domestic violence
advocate institution effectively controls access to social services and
funding for petitioners, which are conditioned on the presence of a
protective order.176 In contrast, Centerville does not offer these same
resources to respondents. The presence of resources and services for
petitioners has led to efforts to even this imbalance, including the formation
of a respondent advocacy organization whose origin includes the
recognition that respondents were losing their housing because of the de
facto preemption of eviction proceedings by protective order
proceedings.177 It has also become true in terms of political power in this
jurisdiction, where this newly created institution is consulted about
institutional questions of the court, including legislation.178
In protective order cases, the proliferation of these institutions is a
direct result of the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA), which provides
federal funding for assistance to petitioners in these cases.179 The
institutional development that has resulted from these choices, however, is
a matter of state and local control.180 The same advocacy organizations that
are part of local institution building in state civil courts are also advocating
for federal funding for these institutions. This institutional development is
a line of research unto itself.181 For purposes of this discussion, each of these
174. Interview with Judge 1, Plainville.
175. Steinberg et al., Judges and Deregulation, supra note 9, at 1330.
176. Interview with Court Actor 3, Centerville; Follow-up Telephone Interview with Court
Actor 3, Centerville.
177. Interview with Court Actor 1, Centerville.
178. Id.
179. See
OVW
Grants
and
Programs,
U.S.
Dep’t
of
Just.,
https://www.justice.gov/ovw/grant-programs (listing 19 grant programs funded by VAWA)
[https://perma.cc/P3PK-HLS7] (last updated Sept. 8, 2021).
180. See OfXice on Violence Against Women (OVW): About the OfXice, U.S. Dep’t of Just.,
https://www.justice.gov/ovw/about-ofXice [https://perma.cc/EGG9-NPG8] (last updated
Mar. 16, 2022) (“[VAWA] [f]unding is awarded to local, state and tribal governments, courts,
non-proXit organizations, [and] community-based organizations . . . to develop effective
responses to violence against women through activities that include direct services, . . . court
improvement, and training for law enforcement and courts.”).
181. For example, is the VAWA example unique or indicative of the history and potential
for the relationship between federal funding and state civil court innovation? Do the courtbased actors responsible for these institutions see themselves as expanding courts? As
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examples is one in which the social needs presented in state civil court
spurred the development of new institutions, sited in the court to differing
degrees, to meet the needs that courts’ dispute resolution design fails to
address.
We can see this phenomenon in other types of cases. For example, in
Philadelphia, a local mortgage foreclosure diversion program began in 2008
(building on work begun in 2004). This program was spearheaded by court
leadership and administered by a combination of judges, clerks, pro bono
attorneys (acting as both advocates for homeowners and as mediators),
cinancial counselors, and legal services providers. It required a prehearing
conference between homeowners and lenders that was supplemented by
court and legal assistance at cirst and ultimately by access to state and
federal subsidies.182 One study of this program includes an example that
identicies the homeowners’ underlying social needs beyond housing. In this
case, the homeowner recinanced her mortgage to “settle credit card debts
while taking care of a disabled mom, a niece, and a nephew.”183 This
institutional development is the predecessor to the current eviction
diversion program in Philadelphia (and similar ones around the country).184
This institution building also captures what have been dubbed “civil
problem-solving courts.” As one of us has discussed in depth, “outside of
family law matters, the problem-solving model has barely cracked the civil
sphere.”185 Problem-solving courts originated in the criminal justice context
and carry with them a host of challenges related to government coercion

bringing social services into courts? As ofXloading social needs to an institution that is
extrajudicial? What is the historical and political perspective on the evolution of these
institutions?
182. The Reinvestment Fund, Philadelphia Residential Mortgage Foreclosure Diversion
Program: Initial Report of Findings 3 (2011), https://www.reinvestment.com/wpcontent/uploads/2015/12/Foreclosure_Diversion_Initial_Report-Report_2011.pdf
[https://perma.cc/L8C4-MTRN].
183. Id. at 15.
184. See Reinvestment Fund, Words From the Field: Practitioner Perspectives on Eviction
Process Improvements in Philadelphia 14 (2021), https://www.reinvestment.com/wpcontent/uploads/2022/02/ReinvestmentFund_Brief-_PHL-Eviction-ProcessImprovements.pdf [https://perma.cc/9HFB-QN5R] (describing Philadelphia’s “Eviction
Diversion Program,” which “requires landlords to apply for emergency rental assistance and
participate in mediation prior to Xiling an eviction case in Municipal Court”); Michaelle Bond,
Philly’s Program for Preventing Evictions is a National Model. Lawmakers Want to Make It
Permanent., Phila. Inquirer (Dec. 8, 2021), https://www.inquirer.com/realestate/housing/rental-assistance-philadelphia-eviction-diversion-program-20211208.html
[https://perma.cc/CD43-CEA2].
185. Jessica K. Steinberg, A Theory of Problem-Solving Courts, 93 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1579,
1582 (2019); see also Douglas B. Marlowe, Carolyn D. Hardin & Carson L. Fox, Nat’l Drug Ct.
Inst., Painting the Current Picture: A National Report on Drug Courts and Other ProblemSolving Courts in the United States 7, 9, 12 (2016) (explaining how as of 2016, there were
nearly 3,000 drug courts, as well as more than 1,000 problem-solving courts devoted to
various issues, including mental health, reentry, domestic violence, veteran’s affairs, and
homelessness).
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and control.186 These same concerns are well-described in the family law
context and others.187 In child welfare cases, problem solving courts are
championed “as a place where a team of professionals led by the judge can
provide a range of assistance,” but as Professor Jane Spinak tells us, “If
courts are not recognized as instruments of coercion and control but as
places to solve problems, there is a [destructive] domino effect on families,
particularly vulnerable families.”188 Research shows that situating
assistance within courts diminishes funding for upstream public health and
harm-reduction interventions at lower cost.189
In the broader civil context, these are “new” courts, designed to address
a particular type of case or collection of claims in the existing system using
a new conciguration of roles or resources.190 For example, one of us has
186. Bach, supra note 132, at 828 (citing a “worry that problem-solving courts inevitably
draw social welfare resources out of communities and voluntary settings and into inevitably
coercive courts”); see also Richard Abel, Introduction, in 1 The Politics of Informal Justice: The
American Experience 1, 5 (Richard L. Abel ed., 1982) (describing how informal processes are
cheap and thus permit an enormous expansion of control); Stacy Lee Burns, The Future of
Problem-Solving Courts: Inside the Courts and Beyond, 10 U. Md. L.J. Race, Religion, Gender &
Class 73, 84 (2010) (“[W]elfare-oriented sentencing alternatives create the risk of net
widening, expanding the scope, breadth, depth and duration of government monitoring and
control over the lives of citizens . . . .”); Amy J. Cohen, Trauma and the Welfare State: A
Genealogy of Prostitution Courts in New York, 95 Tex. L. Rev. 915, 947–51 (2017) (“[T]he
primary business of informal institutions is social control . . . [which] expand[s] the reach of
the state into the lives of the poor and marginalized through discourses of care.”); Eric J. Miller,
Drugs, Courts, and the New Penology, 20 Stan. L. & Pol’y Rev. 417, 425 (2009) (arguing that
the therapeutic methodology adopted by courts “cannot address social features of urban drug
use that have an economic and racial impact”); Anthony C. Thompson, Courting Disorder:
Some Thoughts on Community Courts, 10 Wash U. J.L. & Pol’y 63, 91–92 (2002)
(“[C]ommunity residents may prefer to resolve issues without the threat of the criminal
justice system hanging in the balance.”).
187. Aya Gruber, Amy J. Cohen & Kate Mogulescu, Penal Welfare and the New Human
TrafXicking Intervention Courts, 68 Fla. L. Rev. 1333, 1382–83 (2016); Corey Shdaimah,
Taking a Stand in a Not-So-Perfect World: What’s a Critical Supporter of Problem-Solving
Courts to Do?, 10 U. Md. L.J. Race, Religion, Gender & Class 89, 103–04 (2010); Jane M. Spinak,
A Conversation About Problem-Solving Courts: Take 2, 10 U. Md. L.J. Race, Religion, Gender &
Class 113, 119–24 (2010).
188. Jane M. Spinak, Family Defense and the Disappearing Problem-Solving Court, 20
CUNY L. Rev. 171, 175–76 (2016).
189. See Marsha Garrison, Reforming Child Protection: A Public Health Perspective, 12
Va. J. Soc. Pol’y & L. 590, 619–25 (2005) (discussing cost efXiciency of community-based
preventative programs); Cynthia Godsoe, Just Intervention: Differential Response in Child
Protection, 21 J.L. & Pol’y 73, 82–88 (2012) (discussing effectiveness and value of communitybased organizations in differential response programs).
190. See Marvin S. Swartz & Jeffrey W. Swanson, Mandated Community Treatment in
Services for Persons With Mental Illness, in The Palgrave Handbook of American Mental
Health Policy 171, 176, 179–82 (Howard H. Goldman, Richard G. Frank & Joseph P. Morrissey
eds., 2020) (discussing civil court procedures governing compulsory community treatment
for adults with debilitating psychiatric illnesses and the ethics of compulsory care in a civil
court context, arguing that properly targeted mandatory community treatment is a lessrestrictive alternative to hospitalization or arrest, and challenging other institutional
criticisms).
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written about the District of Columbia’s Housing Conditions Court and its
inquisitorial model of judicially controlled investigation and enforcement of
housing code violations by landlords.191 In this example, a single judge hears
all housing condition complaints by tenants, has a dedicated investigator
who goes to the property to investigate and substantiate the presence of
violations, and then uses both inquisitorial courtroom processes and the
investigator to enforce ongoing compliance with the court’s disposition.192
Another example is in the Red Hook Community Justice Center in New York,
where a partnership between the Center for Court Innovation (a nonprocit)
and New York courts created a neighborhood-based community court
addressing housing cases.193 This institution includes the actual civil
housing docket, consisting of a designated judge and a clerk who work in an
integrated way with housing advocates (who are hybrid employees of the
nonprocit and the court) to address housing problems and cases.194 In
practice, this institutional structure involves informal problem solving
outside of court by the judge and clerk to help litigants address underlying
social needs, and active participation by housing advocates within court
processes to achieve the same goal.195
III. A THEORY OF STATE CIVIL COURTS’ INSTITUTIONAL ROLE
With this fuller picture of social needs in state civil courts, how do
courts’ reactions to the mismatch between their dispute resolution design
and litigants’ social needs inform our institutional theories of state civil
courts? The four categories of court responses in the data—avoiding social
needs, meeting social needs, creating informal law and procedure, and
creating new institutions—give us two core theoretical insights into state
civil courts as institutions. The cirst is that state civil courts can play the role
of violent actor when exercising their dispute resolution function and either
avoiding or meeting social needs. Less directly, state civil courts can be
violent actors through new law and institutions. The second is that when we
look at the diffuse, small-scale actions of state civil courts as a collective
phenomenon, we see that state civil courts are acting as policymakers. In
the absence of action by executive and legislative branches to meet social
needs and the absence of development of formal law by the judicial branch,
the collective actions of individual state civil courts have become our social
policy.
191. Steinberg, Informal, Inquisitorial, and Accurate, supra note 121.
192. Id. at 1064–69.
193. Cynthia G. Lee, Fred L. Cheesman, II, David B. Rottman, Rachel Swaner, Suvi
Lambson, Mike Rempel & Ric Curtis, Nat’l Ctr. for State Cts., A Community Court Grows in
Brooklyn: A Comprehensive Evaluation of the Red Hook Community Justice Center 1 (2013)
https://www.ncsc.org/__data/assets/pdf_Xile/0031/18967/11012013-red-hook-Xinalreport.pdf [https://perma.cc/B82F-U73W].
194. Id.
195. Id.
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Courts as Violent Actors

Robert Cover told us that “[l]egal interpretive acts signal and occasion
the imposition of violence upon others: A judge articulates her
understanding of a text, and as a result, somebody loses his freedom, his
property, his children, even his life.”196 Though scholars and communities
are now in active conversations about this violence, especially in the context
of policing, we have not fully engaged Cover’s insight as it relates to civil
courts.197 Courts’ reactions to social needs presented by litigants can
transform courts into violent institutional actors, whether through attempts
to meet needs or to avoid them. Considering state civil courts as violent
actors also allows us to see the cluid boundary between criminal and civil
law that litigants themselves describe.198
There are important differences—including the explicitly legally
sanctioned tool of violence in the role of police—between theories and
activism around policing and criminal justice and our exploration of state
civil courts. However, there is also a direct parallel to the premise of policing
and criminal justice, which is that the government is an appropriate actor
to promote “safety” as a replacement for private violence. As violent actors
in American society, courts are entangled in our history of slavery and
racism. A historical exposition of the path from slavery to eviction (and
other) court is not the goal of our project, but others are building a range of
insights into these historical paths, and we hope that work continues in
conversation with our deepening examination of state civil courts.199
196. Cover, supra note 15, at 1601; see also Robert M. Cover, Foreword: Nomos and
Narrative, 97 Harv. L. Rev. 4, 57 (1983).
197. Cf. Pierre Schlag, Clerks in the Maze, 91 Mich. L. Rev. 2053, 2054 (1993) (expanding
on Cover, observing “judges conclude their work on a note of violence—a death sentence, an
incarceration, a compulsory wealth transfer,” and arguing that “once we recognize [that]
violence implicit . . . , we are poised to understand that judges . . . have . . . a highly interested,
partial perspective on law”). Building on Cover, Harry Schwirck argues that law “determines
and reXlects what might be termed an economy of violence[,] . . . play[ing] a central role in
deXining what a society will recognize as violence.” Harry Schwirck, Law’s Violence and the
Boundary Between Corporal Discipline and Physical Abuse in German South West Africa, 36
Akron L. Rev. 81, 82 (2002).
198. Sara Sternberg Greene, Race, Class, and Access to Civil Justice, 101 Iowa L. Rev. 1263,
1317 (2016) [hereinafter Greene, Race, Class, and Access to Civil Justice] (observing that
respondents’ past negative experiences with the criminal justice system translate into
reluctance to seek help for civil justice problems); Lauren Sudeall, Integrating the Access to
Justice Movement, 87 Fordham L. Rev. 172, 172–73 (2019) (observing that individuals tend
not to distinguish between civil and criminal justice systems).
199. See, e.g., Deborah N. Archer, Transportation Policy and the Underdevelopment of
Black Communities, 106 Iowa L. Rev. 2125, 2127 (2021) (studying how transportation policy
has historically and currently been used to exploit and subjugate black communities); Maeve
Glass, Citizens of the State, 85 U. Chi. L. Rev. 865, 869 (2018) (arguing that “in the decades
prior to the Fourteenth Amendment, the lawyers who seized on the State Citizenship Clause
of Article IV did so . . . by reframing the issue of American slavery from the rights of a black
person to the sovereignty of a free state”); Kellen Funk, “Let No Man Put Asunder”: South
Carolina’s Law of Divorce, 1895–1950, S.C. Hist. Mag., July–Oct. 2009, at 134.
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As Professor Sinnar has argued, the evolution of civil procedure can be
told as a story of state violence supplanting and formalizing private
violence.200 For example, eviction procedure in state civil court was a state
response to mitigate and regulate the private violence of landlord “selfhelp” or throwing a tenant out of a home without consistent notice or
process.201 But state intervention did not remove violence; rather, it
institutionalized and sanctioned it. This violent role of the state has evolved
in the face of rising inequality, with state-sanctioned removal of people from
their homes affecting millions per year nationally and some counties
removing more than 15% of their residents from their homes.202 As is the
story with many harmful government functions in recent years, it includes
the use of private eviction companies who inclict this violence in the name
of the state.203 Using the case categories from above, we can see an
analogous role of violence in cases where a state civil court action leads to
the government forcefully taking property, most notably foreclosure and
debt collection matters which can be executed forcibly through
garnishment, liens, and asset seizure.204
Further, the courts are well-theorized as violent actors in the child
welfare system.205 It is hard to conceive of a more violent state act than the
200. Sinnar, supra note 16, at *1.
201. Id. at *3.
202. See supra note 94.
203. See Lillian Leung, Peter Hepburn & Matthew Desmond, Serial Eviction Filing: Civil
Courts, Property Management, and the Threat of Displacement, 100 Soc. Forces 316, 333, 337
(2021) (pointing to an example of “the many supplementary business offerings that facilitated
evictions” and documenting the process of serial eviction Xiling, which threatens tenants with
displacement multiple times from the same address and affects a population broader than
only those in poverty); see also Editorial, Philadelphia’s Eviction Process Blindsides Renters,
Phila.
Inquirer
(July
28,
2020),
https://www.inquirer.com/opinion/editorials/a/philadelphia-eviction-system-phillyrenters-tenants-blindsided-20200728.html (on Xile with the Columbia Law Review)
(discussing the use of private Xirms to execute evictions and detailing how tenants rarely
receive notice of such evictions).
204. See Laura Gottesdiener, The Great Eviction, Nation (Aug. 1, 2013),
https://www.thenation.com/article/archive/great-eviction/ (on Xile with the Columbia Law
Review) (describing SWAT teams and armed police removing North Carolina and Atlanta
residents from their homes which were foreclosed on); George Graham, Crowd Protests
Eviction of Father, Son From Foreclosed Home in SpringXield’s Sixteen Acres (Photos, Video),
Mass
Live
(May
25,
2017),
https://www.masslive.com/news/2017/05/watch_crowd_gathers_to_protest.html
[https://perma.cc/AC4M-YNJP] (last updated Jan. 7, 2019) (depicting mortgage foreclosure
eviction in Massachusetts); Laurie Udesky, When Foreclosure Threatens Elder-Care Homes,
N.Y. Times (Apr. 17, 2010), https://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/18/us/18sfforeclose.html
(on Xile with the Columbia Law Review) (describing sheriff conducting foreclosure on
residential-care facilities for the elderly in California).
205. See Susan L. Brooks & Dorothy E. Roberts, Social Justice and Family Court Reform,
40 Fam. Ct. Rev. 453, 453 (2002) (“Poor and minority families, on the other hand, are
disproportionately compelled to appear before family court judges against their will. The
state coercively intervenes in their lives and orders them to submit to the court’s jurisdiction
because parents are charged with child maltreatment or children are charged with
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removal of a child from a parent, whether temporary (as in dependency or
custody proceedings) or permanent (as in termination of parental rights
proceedings). But the violence of state civil courts goes beyond a particular
order in a case. As Professor Roberts has vividly told us, the legal system’s
role inclicts deep, intersectional punishment on subordinated communities
and Black mothers in particular.206 Roberts describes how the
intersectional relationship between foster care and incarceration relies on
the history and societal stereotypes of reproductive regulation and
maternal irresponsibility to “make[] excessive policing by foster care and
prison seem necessary to protect children and the public from harm”207 and
facilitates “[t]he simultaneous buildup and operation of the prison and
foster care systems.”208
In other areas of the law where the role of state civil courts was
intended to mitigate personal violence, the story is more complicated. Our
qualitative data illustrates this complexity. In domestic violence cases, the
explicit role of state civil courts is to protect one citizen from violence by
another citizen. Yet as our data show, some state civil courts have
responded to the complex needs of litigants by engaging services to meet
social needs—but in the context of social control.209 In our data, for example,
by virtue of the legal construct of a protective order, failure to engage in the
offered social provision (such as mental health treatment) can subject a
person to incarceration for failure to comply with terms of the protective
order.210 Ultimately, this approach places “care” in the context of violence
rather than replacing violence with care.211 A similar phenomenon is
captured by Nicole Summers’s dual “social response” and “disciplined
delinquency.”); Kristin Henning, Race, Paternalism, and the Right to Counsel, 54 Am. Crim. L.
Rev. 649, 666 (2017) (pointing out the susceptibility of the “best interests” standard in child
welfare cases to biases based on race and class views); Cortney E. Lollar, Criminalizing (Poor)
Fatherhood, 70 Ala. L. Rev. 125, 131 (2018) (arguing that the child support system
disproportionately affects poor men and showing that criminalization of failing to provide
Xinancially for a biological child is grounded in antiquated moral judgments about
fatherhood); Vivek Sankaran, Christopher Church & Monique Mitchell, A Cure Worse Than the
Disease? The Impact of Removal on Children and Their Families, 102 Marq. L. Rev. 1161, 1194
(2019) (arguing that the child removal process does not often employ proper vetting, thus
unnecessarily inXlicting harm on children and their families); Shanta Trivedi, The Harm of
Child Removal, 43 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change 523, 579–80 (2019) (“[I]n most jurisdictions
in America, courts fail to consider the trauma that children will suffer if they are removed
from their parents . . . . [Y]et [this trauma] remains virtually invisible in most family courts, as
there is no legal requirement that judges take this information into account.”).
206. See Roberts, Systemic Punishment, supra note 131, at 1499–1500.
207. Id. at 1500.
208. Id. at 1476.
209. See supra notes 185–189 and accompanying text.
210. See supra note 145.
211. See Bach, supra note 132, at 814 (“[W]hen the law merges care and punishment, it
both draws more individuals into punitive institutions . . . and compromises the quality of the
care overall.”); Cohen, supra note 186, at 916–17 (“But we have not simply witnessed the
retrenchment of particular welfare state programs alongside the intensiXication of carceral
ones. Today, the criminal justice system provides its own welfarist institutions.”).
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tenant” features of civil probation as mechanisms of control, advantaging
landlords and sanctioned by courts.212 In Summers’s analysis of settlements
in eviction cases, she identicies the overwhelming presence of the social
response function, where landlords use settlement agreements to impose
additional terms on the social and economic problems that arise in the
underlying eviction matter.213 For example, where a tenant fails to pay rent,
the settlement agreement imposes more burdensome obligations on
payment going forward.214 Summers identicies a similarly pervasive but
broader phenomenon of the disciplined tenant function, where landlords
use settlement agreements to more generally impose greater controls on
tenants, unrelated to the underlying claims for eviction.215 For example, in
an eviction for nonpayment, the settlement agreement imposes stricter
terms regarding the occupancy of the property.216 All of these make tenants
more vulnerable to losing their homes with the imprimatur of the state.
The experience of court itself can also be violent. Professor Barbara
Bedzek’s rich description of housing court as “violence in the form of spiritmurder” captures this phenomenon.217 It is more recently explained by
work examining trauma and the law. Research describes the
retraumatization of survivors of intimate partner violence in both civil and
criminal courts.218 Others have analyzed how civil court notions of
adversarialism,
judicial
impartiality,
and
formalism
affect
retraumatization.219

212. Summers, supra note 149 (manuscript at 42).
213. See id. (manuscript at 3) (Xinding that “the majority of settlement agreements
impose a series of interlocking terms that amount to . . . civil probation”).
214. Id. (manuscript at 42).
215. See id. (manuscript at 42–43).
216. Id. (manuscript at 43).
217. Barbara Bezdek, Silence in the Court: Participation and Subordination of Poor
Tenants’ Voices in Legal Process, 20 Hofstra L. Rev. 533, 541 (1992) (citing Patricia Williams,
Spirit-Murdering the Messenger: The Discourse of Fingerpointing as the Law’s Response to
Racism, 42 U. Miami L. Rev. 127 (1987)).
218. Negar Katirai, Retraumatized in Court, 62 Ariz. L. Rev. 81, 93 (2020) (surveying
advocates and Xinding that 83% of survivors reported retraumatization due to court
procedures and outcomes).
219. Id. at 101–07; see also Leigh Goodmark, Decriminalizing Domestic Violence 152
(2018) (“In order to minimize the trauma of incarceration it is also essential to enforce
measures intended to protect prisoners from violence.”); Alesha Durfee, “Usually It’s
Something in the Writing”: Reconsidering the Narrative Requirement for Protection Order
Petitions, 5 U. Miami Race & Soc. Just. L. Rev. 469, 482 (2015) (“However, the adversarial
nature of the legal system, in combination with complex and confusing bureaucratic
procedures and untrained court staff, may make the PO process an incredibly traumatizing
experience—even with the ‘right’ support and in the ‘right’ environment.”); Deborah Epstein
& Lisa A. Goodman, Discounting Women: Doubting Domestic Violence Survivors’ Credibility
and Dismissing Their Experiences, 167 U. Pa. L. Rev. 399, 447–48 (2019) (“But she is also
hoping for validation of the harm she has endured—in other words, to have her experience
credited.”).
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Sometimes the violence of state civil courts explicitly engages with the
violence of mass incarceration. This occurs largely as a penalty for
noncompliance with civil court orders. For example, a respondent subject
to a protective order is subject to arrest for violating the order or its
conditions (which, as discussed above, can include “care” such as a
mandated addiction program).220 As in Turner v. Rogers, a parent who fails
to pay child support can be incarcerated by a civil court.221 Research done
by Professors Lauren Sudeall and Sara Sternberg Greene shows us how
litigants experience this cluid boundary between civil and criminal law.222
Across the types of social needs presented in state civil courts, the mismatch
between these needs and courts’ dispute resolution design exacerbates
state civil courts’ violent role.
B.

Courts as Policymakers

Thus far, we have discussed state civil courts as a constellation of
institutions reacting to the mismatch between social needs and dispute
resolution. Taking a broader view of these reactions, we posit that courts
are functioning as policymaking bodies in three related ways. First, in
attempting to provide services to meet litigant needs, courts have
developed a patchy, underresourced role as a provider of social services.
These choices about resource allocation are appropriate for the other
branches of government, but courts have become de facto decisionmakers.
Second, in creating and changing law and procedure, courts are engaging in
ad hoc procedure and law development in ways that are not occasional or
exceptional but are collectively shaping law and policy. Third, in creating
new government institutions, courts are squarely performing the work of
the executive and legislative branches via individual experiments without
the benecit of experimentalism. Each of these policymaking roles for courts
raises questions of legitimacy and rule of law, transparency and focus on
litigants, and quality outcomes and experimentalism.
Ours is a different conception of courts as policymakers than
scholarship typically explores. As a general matter, critiques of courts as
policymaking bodies exist in the context of represented, adversarial
litigation and the cinal, merit-based decisions that emerge from this process.
Scholars often criticize the idea of courts as policymakers—as activist
judges attempting to legislate from the bench.223 These criticisms
220. See generally Nat’l Ctr. on Prot. Ords. & Full Faith & Credit, supra note 145 (detailing
the protective order laws in every state and the repercussions for violating them).
221. 564 U.S. 431, 435 (2011).
222. See Greene, Race, Class, and Access to Civil Justice, supra note 198; Sudeall, supra
note 198.
223. For an overview of this critique, see Jack L. Landau, The Myth of Judicial Activism, 70
Or. St. Bar Bull. 26, 27 (2010) (arguing that “no one actually says what he or she means” when
criticizing “judicial activism” and describing three ways in which people perceive that judges
improperly use their power, including by assuming too much policymaking authority); Bruce
G. Peabody, Legislating From the Bench: A DeXinition and a Defense, 11 Lewis & Clark L. Rev.
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emphasize courts’ lack of accountability to the public.224 Other scholars
sharpen this critique, arguing that even agencies are more democratically
accountable than courts and thus are more legitimate policymaking
bodies.225 Some criticisms center on institutional competence of courts.226
Other scholars argue that policymaking is a legitimate enterprise for U.S.
courts, for example in prison reform227 and mass tort litigation.228 Some
scholars claim that this policymaking is unavoidable and discuss how courts
185, 189 (2007) (tracking criticisms of courts as activist policymakers and arguing some
“legislating from the bench” is both inevitable and desirable); Paul Gewirtz & Chad Golder,
Opinion,
So
Who
Are
the
Activists?,
N.Y.
Times
(July
6,
2005),
https://www.nytimes.com/2005/07/06/opinion/so-who-are-the-activists.html (on Xile
with the Columbia Law Review) (noting that the term “activist judge” is loosely deXined in the
public discourse, arguing that striking down acts of Congress is the most “activist” thing a
judge can do, and tallying how often Justices voted to overturn acts of Congress).
224. See generally Thomas L. Jipping, Legislating from the Bench: The Greatest Threat to
Judicial Independence, 43 S. Tex. L. Rev. 141, 158 (2001) (describing two “models of judicial
power,” judicial restraint and judicial activism, and arguing judicial activism threatens
America’s independent judiciary); H. Lee Sarokin, Thwarting the Will of the Majority, 20
Whittier L. Rev. 171 (1998) (challenging criticisms of the judiciary as a policymaking body);
cf. Neil S. Siegel, Interring the Rhetoric of Judicial Activism, 59 DePaul L. Rev. 555, 555–56
(2010) (challenging two ways that Republicans use the term “judicial activism” and arguing
that “equating judicial activism with the refusal to show deference to elected ofXicials is
inconsistent with much of modern Republican politics” and “presupposes an unsustainably
sharp distinction between constitutional politics and constitutional law”). The debates over
judicial activism, of course, have often ugly political histories. See Erwin Chemerinsky, Federal
Jurisdiction 148 (1989) (detailing the legislative branch’s attempts to prevent federal courts
from hearing cases involving challenges to state laws permitting school prayers or state laws
restricting access to abortions).
225. Agencies, even independent agencies, are typically viewed as more democratically
responsive than the courts. See Michael A. Fitts, Retaining the Rule of Law in a Chevron World,
66 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 355, 356–57 (1990) (asserting that agencies are “under the informal
control of either a democratically elected Congress or President”); Cass R. Sunstein, Law and
Administration After Chevron, 90 Colum. L. Rev. 2071, 2088 n.80 (1900) (“[T]he democratic
pedigree of the agency is usually superior to that of the court.”).
226. See Eric Berger, Comparative Capacity and Competence, 2020 Wis. L. Rev. 215, 219–
23 (collecting research discussing the comparative competence of courts to make policy
determinations relative to legislatures and executives). This argument also features
prominently in legal process theory. See, e.g., Ernest A. Young, Institutional Settlement in a
Globalizing Judicial System, 54 Duke L.J. 1143, 1149–50 (2005) (arguing for “institutional
settlement” within legal process theory, which looks at how society decided “that law should
allocate decisionmaking to the institutions best suited to decide particular questions, and that
the decisions arrived at by those institutions must then be respected by other actors in the
system”).
227. See Malcolm M. Feeley & Edward L. Rubin, Judicial Policy Making and the Modern
State: How the Courts Reformed America’s Prisons 27–95 (1998) (arguing that policymaking
is a standard and legitimate function of modern courts, using prison reform cases between
1965 and 1990 as an example of a high-water mark of U.S. judicial policymaking).
228. Sandra Nichols Thaim, Carol Adaire Jones, Cynthia R. Harris & Samuel F. Koenig,
Chapter 5: Courts as Policymakers: The Uneven Justice of Asbestos Mass Tort Litigation, in
Looking Back to Move Forward: Resolving Health & Environmental Crises 133, 134–36 (2020)
(noting that while mass tort law was inadequate to address the problem, the courts stepped
in to play a larger role after Congress did not step in).
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actually incluence policy change.229 In light of “the expansion of judicial
review,” others call for elections of judges, formalizing their role as
policymakers.230 Other scholarship considers the role of the judiciary in
moderating the policymaking balance between the legislative and executive
branches. Scholars consider how the judiciary moderates the separation of
judicial and executive power.231 Some scholars argue that no dominant
institution exists among the various players in the federal policymaking
process; instead, “all governing institutions can have a clear role in making
public policy as well as enforcing and legitimizing it.”232
Rather than capturing (federal) courts playing a legislative
(congressional) role via interpretation of (federal) statutes, we are
theorizing a different policymaking role of state civil courts. In this
formulation, state civil courts are acting in the void created by the failure of
the executive and legislative branches to meet people’s social needs.233 And
this activity is engaging the myriad within-case decisions that occur in
lawyerless courts.234 This policymaking activity maps onto the four versions
of courts’ institutional role described above and is complicated by its diffuse
and experimental nature. Each example of policymaking is individualized,
though there are themes across state civil courts that have de facto become
collective action.
Where courts shift their role to provide resources to meet litigants’
needs, the courts are squarely assuming the roles of the executive and
legislative branches in social provision. In some instances, courts are
providing social services, traditionally an executive branch function. In
other instances, courts behave like legislatures by deciding that a particular
type of service provision is necessary and dedicating court system funding
to this social provision. This captures those actions described above as
229. See generally Robert M. Howard & Amy Steigerwalt, Judging Law and Policy: Courts
and the Policymaking in the American Political System (2012) (analyzing the role of the Court
in policymaking in seven distinct policy areas and exploring both how courts interact with
other branches of government and whether judicial policymaking is a form of activist
judging).
230. See Rachel Paine CauXield, The Curious Logic of Judicial Elections, 64 Ark. L. Rev. 249,
260 (2011) (arguing that “the nature of judicial power has changed, necessitating popular
control”).
231. See, e.g., Paul Gewirtz, The Courts, Congress, and Executive Policy-Making: Notes on
Three Doctrines, 40 Law & Contemp. Probs. 46, 46 (1976) (EP).
232. Making Policy, Making Law: An Interbranch Perspective 204 (Mark C. Miller & Jeb
Barnes eds., 2004).
233. Our analysis here builds on a range of earlier work exploring how, in the absence of
effective structural solutions at the highest level, informal regimes develop. See, e.g., Susan
Sturm, Second Generation Employment Discrimination: A Structural Approach, 101 Colum. L.
Rev. 458, 461–63 (2001) (describing the “interesting and complex regulatory pattern” that
has emerged, in which “normative elaboration occurs through a Xluid, interactive relationship
between problem solving and problem deXinition within speciXic workplaces and in multiple
other arenas, including but not limited to the judiciary”).
234. Carpenter et al., Judges in Lawyerless Courts, supra note 8 (manuscript at 22);
Carpenter et al., “New” Civil Judges, supra note 22, at 257.
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courts “attempting social provision,” such as the judges in our data who
order drug treatment programs for respondents. It also captures those
attempts at social provision that send litigants (with or without coercion)
to access social services provided or funded by other branches of
government. For example, when a court refers a litigant to a housing
support organization, that court is making policy choices about who should
use those services and ultimately how those services should be funded.
Across these examples, the judicial branch is playing a policymaking role in
how social services are created, funded, and delivered. Embedded in each of
these individualized choices are decisions that collectively shape policy
about social provision in a particular jurisdiction and across cities and
states.
At least state civil courts—even if in limited, ad hoc ways—are trying
to meet social needs in the face of stark inequality. Yet, this institutional role
is fraught. This state civil court role operates in the absence of coherent or
comprehensive resources. Sometimes this means a judge makes cold
referrals that may or may not result in actual assistance. Other times, court
actors are leveraging personal or institutional relationships to try to achieve
results for litigants in need of services. Our data reclect self-awareness by
court actors about their limits in this ad hoc activity.235 Taken together, this
shift in institutional role is resource constrained, institutionally limited, and
inconsistent.
A second way of understanding state civil courts as policymakers is
where courts create or change law or procedure to meet litigants’ needs.
This is closer to the traditional scholarly conception of courts as
policymakers. However, the nature of the mismatch in state civil courts
makes this policymaking role different from theories of federal courts. It is
also less transparent because almost all of this activity is unwritten.236 In
some circumstances, the court action to create unwritten law or procedure
comes in the face of an afcirmative choice by a legislature to not fund a
particular service. For example, in our data, Plainville is in a state which has
one of the weakest social safety nets in the country and ranks at or near the
bottom of many measures of states’ investments in social services, health

235. One judge told us:
[Y]ou do the best you can do to do the job you were selected to do. You show up,
you prepare, you set expectations for your courtroom, you try to keep people safe,
and you try to do justice. But I don’t know []that any local judge would have the
ability to answer that. Our courts have changed. You didn’t have a protective order
docket before. You have [DV Agency] and family and children’s services, and they
were set up to give these people justice. We have a system in place to help people
get to court, the next step is what do you do for the defendants?
Interview with Judge 1, Plainville.
A domestic violence advocate told us, “I think the way [Centerville] sets up their process [is]
really difXicult. When they decided to tie resources to court outcomes it was a mistake in my
opinion.” Interview with Court Actor 3, Centerville.
236. See supra notes 159–160 and accompanying text.
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care, and economic supports.237 We see the consequences of this in
Plainville courts that are staying cases, dismissing cases, and sending cases
to other dockets to avoid harmful outcomes in the absence of these social
services. In other circumstances, state civil courts are acting in the face of
inactivity by the executive and legislative branches. For example, in our
data, a judge who chooses not to issue a protective order because the
absence of affordable housing means someone will become homeless.238 Or
the judge who chooses to issue a protective order to keep a father from
doing drugs with his daughter because the absence of addiction or mental
health treatment means it is the only alternative.239 There is no law or
procedure in these cases that provides an exception to protective order
requirements when housing is not available. And there is no law or
procedure that allows protective orders to prevent a parent from doing
drugs with a child (in the absence of protective order criteria being met).
Yet in these circumstances, courts are creating or changing law—in
individualized, unwritten ways—to meet litigant needs in the absence of
social provision by other branches of government.
When state civil courts create or change law and procedure, they
confront the range of concerns articulated by Professors Bookman and Noll
in Ad Hoc Procedure.240 In this environment, it is no longer possible to
operate within “rules cixed and announced beforehand—rules which make
it possible to foresee with fair certainty how the [state] will use its coercive
powers in given circumstances.”241 This activity by state civil courts engages
questions of legal legitimacy (whether the action by the court is in fact
lawful), sociological legitimacy (whether the action is seen by the public as
appropriate in general), and moral legitimacy (whether the action is morally
justiciable or worthy of respect).242 State civil courts’ creation of law and
procedure in the face of the clash between dispute resolution design and
social needs is a direct, repeated expression of a “desire to address [a
problem that the civil justice system provides in ordinary cases] as opposed
237. OxFam, The Best and Worst States to Work in America—During COVID-19,
https://www.oxfamamerica.org/explore/countries/united-states/poverty-in-the-us/covidmap/ [https://perma.cc/N7UD-8ZR6] (last visited Feb. 10, 2022).
238. Notes of Hearing 24, Townville (Judge 2).
239. Notes of Hearing 18, Plainville (Judge 1).
240. Bookman & Noll, supra note 159, at 829–35.
241. Friedrich A. Hayek, The Road to Serfdom 72 (1944); see also Bookman & Noll, supra
note 159, at 774 (“Designed to address speciXic problems, ad hoc procedure cannot rely on
the fact that it is crafted behind a veil of ignorance in advance of concrete disputes as proof of
its fairness.”).
242. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Legitimacy and the Constitution, 118 Harv. L. Rev. 1787,
1796–1801 (2005) (explaining legitimacy as a moral concept); see also Bookman & Noll,
supra note 159, at 835 (questioning whether ad hoc judging can be legitimate); Tom R. Tyler,
Psychological Perspectives on Legitimacy and Legitimation, 57 Ann. Rev. Psych. 375, 376, 379
(2006) (reviewing and summarizing the psychological literature on legitimacy, “a property
that, when it is possessed, leads people to defer voluntarily to decisions, rules, and social
arrangements”).
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to a desire to address systemic concerns.”243 This practice threatens the
legitimacy that is traditionally part of civil procedure and thus civil
litigation. Yet at the same time it is necessary in the context of state civil
courts because—in the absence of ad hoc law and procedure—these courts’
dysfunction would undermine legitimacy even more.244 What this leads to
in the context of state civil courts is a collective rather than exceptional
phenomenon of ad hoc law and procedure. And this institutional function
renders state civil courts policymakers.
Finally, the starkest version of courts as policymakers is when state
civil courts create new institutions. As the examples above demonstrate,
these new institutions are often the result of the sheer will of a few
individuals trying to meet the deep need for social provision in a particular
type of case.245 As with the other categories of courts as policymakers, this
is not an objectively negative phenomenon. Yet a structural perspective
reveals the problems with it.
First, this institution building is a collection of experiments without the
benecit of experimentalism. There is often neither intention at the outset
nor structure in the implementation that allows learning from these
responses to social needs. Yet, the institution building continues, relying at
best on the limited available research of prior experiments. As we have
discussed more generally in the context of lawyerless courts, there are
growing and valiant efforts underway to deepen our research into these
courts. This institutional experimentation is a particular subset of that need:
We need a systemic approach to experimentation to meet the systemic
needs the experiments attempt to address.246
Second, this experimentation is a reaction by the judicial branch to the
absence of social provision by the executive and legislative branches. And
the absence of a systemic approach means that we are avoiding important
institutional questions about the appropriate role for the judicial branch.
These questions are about the appropriate separation of powers and, more
generally, whether judicially created institutions in this role are consistent

243. Bookman & Noll, supra note 159, at 784.
244. Id. at 845 (noting that although “ad hoc procedure presents a deep challenge
to traditional model of civil procedure . . . , ad hoc procedure-making bolsters the civil justice
system’s legitimacy by ensuring that procedural problems do not prevent it from
functioning”).
245. See Steinberg, Informal, Inquisitorial, and Accurate, supra note 121, at 1067–69
(describing Washington, D.C.’s Housing Conditions Court founded by an individual judge).
246. See Monica Bell, Andrea Taverna, Dhruv Aggarwal & Isra Syed, Laboratories of
Suffering: Toward Democratic Welfare Governance, in Holes in the Safety Net: Federalism and
Poverty 40, 63–67 (Ezra Rosser ed., 2019) (“[T]o alleviate suffering, policy makers and
scholars must take a holistic view of poor people’s lives to best design welfare policy.”). See
generally Monica Bell, Stephanie Garlock & Alexander Nabavi-Noo, Toward a Demosprudence
of Poverty, 69 Duke L.J. 1473 (2020) (surveying the structural and substantive impacts of the
“criminalization of poverty”).
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with our democratic aims. They also raise questions about courts’ role as
bureaucracies, with the attendant challenges of bureaucratic behavior.247
We are not arguing that courts should stop this activity but rather
asking how courts’ leadership in this institution building could motivate
action by legislators.248 Courts are not designed for social provision, yet they
are attempting to do so with a range of consequences. This may well be the
best alternative in a political environment hostile to social provision. The
assumption that courts are resolving disputes may provide political cover
for social provision that a legislature would not support. At a minimum,
courts are carrying a burden that is not part of their design as institutions.
Courts cannot reasonably be expected to stop their ad hoc social provision
in the face of persistent, serious social needs. Yet we need to ask whether
courts’ activity, and especially de facto policymaking, is preventing other
parts of government from addressing these social needs head on.
In the end, courts are taking up the mantle of social provision in a range
of ways, and this collective activity is shifting their institutional role. State
civil courts are designed as sites of dispute resolution, yet in the face of
social needs they are functioning as legislative and policy bodies in a way
that is neither appropriate to their role as a coequal branch of government
nor grounded in collective, experimental problem solving.
CONCLUSION
“I mean the whole system is completely broken and needs to be cirebombed.”249
If the challenges of state civil courts are bigger than particular actors,
we need to ask how we should engage with this new understanding of
courts as democratic institutions. How do we imagine a different future
where our democratic values are realized in the institutions of state civil
courts? How do we imagine, where we currently see a social need from one
litigant, a world where that social provision is completely realized such that
the needs of both litigants are ultimately met? These questions clow from
our institutional theory of state civil courts and also require more depth

247. See Owen M. Fiss, The Bureaucratization of the Judiciary, 92 Yale L.J. 1442, 1443
(1983) (noting that “in the context of the judiciary, bureaucratization poses a unique
challenge to the legitimacy of governmental power”); Patrick G. Scott & Sanjay K. Pandey, Red
Tape and Public Service Motivation: Findings From a National Survey of Managers in State
Health and Human Services Agencies, 25 Rev. Pub. Pers. Admin. 155, 156 (2005) (observing
that “one particular malady [of government bureaucracy] that remains resistant to reform
efforts is red tape”); Patricia M. Wald, Bureaucracy and the Courts, 92 Yale L.J. 1478, 1483–85
(1983) (arguing that “judges ought to give more attention to managing the judicial process”).
248. See Bookman & Noll, supra note 159, at 787 (“Just as the problems presented by a
particular case or type of litigation may prompt a court to develop a new form of procedure,
they may motivate lawmakers to redirect claims to a new tribunal that is designed to work
better than courts.”).
249. Interview with Court Actor 4, Plainville.
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than we can offer here. We offer, in conclusion, some insights to frame our
own—and we hope others’—imagining of a way forward.
We start with our need for more intellectual and political investment
in identifying, developing, and prioritizing structures that support a
“rightsized” role for state civil courts. There is a movement among scholars
and institutional actors to cix the problems we and others name.250 Any
change that meets these democratic challenges must focus on changing
these structural, institutional dynamics, not just practicing within them. The
current menu of incremental reforms, focused on actors in the system, may
improve people’s lives and suppress immediate conclagrations in the
system. And we also need a more audacious agenda.
Any structural change to state civil courts requires mobilization,
including by actors within state civil courts. This is part of a much larger set
of theoretical questions about such mobilization.251 One component is that
lawyers, judges, court clerks, and others who see the daily realities of state
civil courts need to exercise their collective political power.252 Another is
that courts need to collaborate with communities to build political will. This
requires a shift in thinking to see that in many ways state civil courts are
well-positioned to orient themselves more intentionally toward community
needs.253
250. See Tonya L. Brito, Kathryn A. Sabbeth, Jessica K. Steinberg, and Lauren Sudeall,
Racial Capitalism in the Civil Courts, 122 Colum. L. Rev. *** (2022); Portia Pedro, A Prelude to
a Critical Race Theoretical Account of Civil Procedure, 107 Va. L. Rev. Online 143, 156 (2021)
(“While some organizers are calling for police abolition, prison abolition, or both, there is not
a widespread call for abolishing courts. Or at least there is not such a call yet.”); Jessica K.
Steinberg, Colleen F. Shanahan, Alyx Mark & Anna Carpenter, The Democratic (Il)legitimacy
of Assembly-Line Litigation, 135 Harv. L. Rev. Forum (forthcoming 2022) (manuscript at 4)
(proposing debt-collection litigation reform that is focused on “reestablishing the democratic
legitimacy of state civil courts by increasing social provision to defendants economically
ravished by assembly-line litigation and also by keeping courts squarely in the business of
resolving two-party adversarial disputes”).
251. For example, systems of social provision in the United States have been
institutionalized in various ways that reinforce inequality in society. See Andrea Louise
Campbell, How Policies Make Citizens: Senior Political Activism and the American Welfare
State 10 (2003) (arguing that seniors’ welfare state programs have moderated political
inequality among senior citizens but have exacerbated it between different age groups); Joe
Soss, Unwanted Claims: The Politics of Participation in the U.S. Welfare System 1–2 (2000)
(arguing that the welfare system is a political institution that has the potential to empower or
marginalize its clients). Our concern is with reimagining state civil courts, but this necessarily
engages the motivations of political actors more broadly. See, e.g., Vesla M. Weaver & Amy E.
Lerman, Political Consequences of the Carceral State, 104 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 817, 829–32
(2010).
252. See Shanahan & Carpenter, supra note 13, at 133–34 (“Any change must begin with
courts and lawyers refusing to blindly accept the courts as a last resort against the legislative
and executive branches’ failures to address inequality.”).
253. Joanne Scott & Susan Sturm, Courts as Catalysts: Re-Thinking the Judicial Role in
New Governance, 13 Colum. J. Eur. L. 565, 592–94 (2007) (“The judicial function ought to be—
and in some important respects already is—able to work collaboratively with other actors in
devising and promoting governance structures which are at once effective and legitimate in
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This mobilization explicitly requires engaging the legislative and
executive branches. This engagement is certainly political: Judges should be
collectively educating and motivating their state legislatures to act.254 It also
requires deep investment in, and vulnerability to, research and data
collection. The thicker our understanding of state civil courts, writ large and
in particular examples, the better courts can make the case for reshaping
themselves as institutions. Another component of this mobilization is
intentional experimentation in how we “rightsize” state civil courts. This is
not experimentation for its own sake but rather for choosing interventions
that take inertia away from the status quo.255 Such experimentation yields
information and iteration that demonstrates more legitimate, democratic,
cost-effective roles for courts. And this in turn generates political power. As
others have pointed out, poverty and inequality will necessarily require
political consensus on some substance, and experimentation can be a tool
to reach those goals.256
State civil courtrooms have become emergency rooms because
people’s social needs remain unmet. Each day courts around the country are
forced to confront this institutional mismatch in the face of this broader
democratic failure. The time has come to address this institutional challenge
head on. We need to engage in the collective exercise of reimagining state
civil courts as democratic institutions.

problem-solving.”); Massachusetts Trial Court, Ctr. for Institutional & Soc. Change,
https://change-center.law.columbia.edu/research-projects/massachusetts-trial-court
[https://perma.cc/3DU5-UA6C] (last visited Feb. 10, 2022).
254. See Carpenter et al., Judges in Lawyerless Courts, supra note 8 (manuscript at 59)
(noting that “researchers, policymakers, and court leaders can explore questions about how
best to inXluence and shape the future of judging”).
255. See Mariame Kaba, We Do This ‘Til We Free Us: Abolitionist Organizing and
Transforming Justice 127 (2021); Amna A. Akbar, An Abolitionist Horizon for (Police) Reform,
108 Calif. L. Rev. 1781, 1788 (2020) (“Abolitionist demands speak to the fundamental crises
of our times, challenge our siloed expertise as legal scholars, and invite us to reconsider our
commitments to the status quo.”).
256. See Charles Sabel, Dewey, Democracy, and Democratic Experimentalism, 9 Contemp.
Pragmatism 35, 44–45 (2012) (noting that “experimentalist lawmaking and
administration . . . begin[] with agreement at the highest-level jurisdiction . . . on broad
framework goals”); David A. Super, Laboratories of Destitution: Democratic Experimentalism
and the Failure of Antipoverty Law, 157 U. Pa. L. Rev. 541, 547 (2008) (“[T]he lack of a
meaningful consensus about the substantive goals of antipoverty law prevents coherent
evaluation of the results of policy experiments: without an agreed-upon set of goals, we
cannot agree on what ‘works’ to accomplish them.”).
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APPENDIX
Our state level data come from the National Center for State Courts
(NCSC) and are from all 9ifty states, the District of Columbia, Guam, and
Puerto Rico for the years 2012 through 2019.1 The totals reported here are
cases initiated in the calendar year. The data appear in two ways. First, NCSC
collects overall caseload data from states, as re9lected in Table 1A. Second,
NCSC collects caseload data by case types, as re9lected in Tables 1B and 2.
There is no discernible pattern—either within states or across time—
in how states report categorical data. Sometimes a state does no reporting
in a given year. Sometimes a state never reports a particular case type,
suggesting either that the state does not collect that data or that case type is
not applicable under the state’s law. Finally, there is inherent variation in
how states report case types. For example, states have different thresholds
for the value of claims in small claims court, and so the same exact case in
one state would be in the “Small Claims” category and in another state in the
“Buyer Plaintiff” category. Although the purpose of this study is not to
explain why states may or may not have reported data in a given year, future
research could investigate these trends.
We readily acknowledge this inconsistency in state-level reporting
within the study period and know that court leadership and the NCSC are
working to improve reporting. The estimates presented here represent
these data to the best of our ability given the constraints of what is reported.
For each case type in Table 2, we calculate the proportion of cases that the
case type represented in a given year and then average that proportion
across the years in the study period. We also list the average number of
reporting states and range in annual reporting to offer information about
the sensitivity in the results when different states report in different
years—investigating this variation may be another fruitful avenue for
1. For case reporting methodology and categories, see Ct. Stat. Project, State Court
Guide
to
Statistical
Reporting
3–9
(2020),
https://www.courtstatistics.org/__data/assets/pdf_Iile/0026/23984/state-court-guide-tostatistical-reporting.pdf [https://perma.cc/K45R-QF66]. For the underlying data, see CSP
STAT, Ct. Stat. Project, https://www.courtstatistics.org/court-statistics/interactive-caseloaddata-displays/csp-stat [https://perma.cc/YB3S-VSGT] (last visited Feb. 10, 2022). We’d like
to acknowledge the NCSC staff who contributed to each of the annual reports: Alice K. Allred,
Brandan P. Collins, Kathryn A. Holt, Robert C. LaFountain, Kathryn J. Lewis, Diana McSpadden,
Richard Y. SchaufIler & Shauna M. Strickland (2012); Alice K. Allred, Kathryn A. Holt, Robert
C. LaFountain, Kathryn J. Lewis, Richard Y. SchaufIler & Shauna M. Strickland (2013); Alice K.
Allred, Kathryn J. Genthon, Kathryn A. Holt, Robert C. LaFountain, Richard Y. SchaufIler &
Shauna M. Strickland, (2015); Alice K. Allred, Kathryn J. Genthon, Kathryn A. Holt, Robert C.
LaFountain, Richard Y. SchaufIler, Shauna M. Strickland, Olivia H. Underwood, Brittney M. Via
& Nicole L. Waters (2016); Natasha C. Anderson, Kathryn J. Genthon, Robert C. LaFountain,
Olivia H. Lyles, Diane Robinson, Brittney M. Via & Nicole L. Waters (2017); Alice K. Allred,
Amanda N. Fisher Boyd, Kathryn J. Genthon, Sarah A. Gibson, Robert C. “Neil” LaFountain,
Diane L. Robinson & Nicole L. Waters (2018); Kathryn J. Genthon, Sarah A. Gibson, Miriam
Hamilton, B. Harris, Diane L. Robinson & Nicole L. Waters (2019).
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scholars. As perspective, the category level reporting in Tables 1B and 2
capture reporting by states representing a range of 73–96% of the
population based on 2019 U.S. Census Bureau data.2
Table 1A – Incoming State Cases as Reported by NCSC3
2012–2019
Total
Civil

118,445,434

2012–2019
Annual
Average
14,805,679

Domestic Relations

35,896,527

4,487,066

44

Criminal

117,823,758

1,133,669

43

Juvenile

9,069,353

14,727,970

38

330,980,859

41,372,607

38

Traffic

Average # States
Reporting
44

Table 1B – Incoming State Cases Based on Revised Categories4
2012–2019
Total
Civil Justice Needs Cases

85,762,530

2012–2019
Annual
Average
10,720,316

Criminal (Adult) Cases

44,358,919

5,544,865

17

Juvenile Delinquency Cases

2,348,174

293,522

19

307,927,304

38,490,913

25

Traffic Cases

Average # States
Reporting
22

2. See
QuickFacts:
United
States,
U.S.
Census
Bureau,
https://www.census.gov/quickfacts [https://perma.cc/26AY-G7TY] (last visited Feb. 10,
2022).
3. This table captures all reporting from states that reported total incoming cases (e.g.,
“Civil Total”), regardless of whether they reported case types (e.g., “Small Claims”) in a given
year. This table uses the same categories as the NCSC.
4. This table is the sum of all incoming cases that were reported by case type. It uses
the categories developed in Table 2. Because fewer states report by case type than overall
incoming cases, there are fewer cases reported here.
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Table 2 – Civil Justice Needs Cases5
2012–2019
Proportion
of Civil
Incoming
Cases

Range in
States
Reporting
(Range in
Annual
Proportion)

Social
Need
Presented

Social
Need
Underlying

Average
# States
Reporting

10.03%

Mixed

Mixed

41

6.96%

Mixed

Yes

37

4.22%

Mixed

Mixed

31

Mental Health

3.58%

Yes

Yes

38

Probate/
Estate (Other)

1.97%

Mixed

Mixed

22

Domestic
Relations
(Other)*

1.38%

Mixed

Mixed

19

1.10%

Mixed

Mixed

22

14–26
(0.81%–
1.25%)

0.56%

Yes

Yes

27

19–36
(0.40%–
0.70%)

0.38%

Yes

Yes

28

23–32
(0.17%–
0.60%)

0.10%

Yes

Yes

16

9–21
(0.00%–
0.19%)

Relationships
Total
Dissolution/
Divorce*
Civil Protection
Restraining
Orders*
Probate/
Wills/
Intestate

Non-Domestic
Relations
Restraining
Order
Guardianship
(Adult)
Conservatorship/
Trusteeship
Guardianship
(Unknown)

30.28%
37–44
(8.52%–
11.44%)
33–40
(6.71%–
7.47%)
22–36
(2.93%–
4.98%)
31–42
(2.83%–
3.97%)
16–28
(1.84%–
2.09%)
12–25
(1.05%–
1.57%)

5. The proportions in this table use the total incoming cases reIlected in Table 1B as
their denominator. Case types marked with * are ones NCSC categorizes as “Domestic
Relations.” Case types marked with ** are ones NCSC categorizes as “Juvenile.” In addition,
Habeas Corpus cases are included as “Criminal” and not “Civil” in our categorization.
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Small Claims
Small Claims6
(Tort, Contract
and Property)

18.92%

Children Total

15.45%

Mixed

Mixed

38

Support IVD*

6.17%

Yes

Yes

21

Paternity*

2.11%

Mixed

Yes

35

Dependency
Abuse/
Neglect**

1.66%

Yes

Yes

31

Custody*

1.28%

Mixed

Mixed

25

Status
Offense**

0.90%

Yes

Yes

28

Dependency
Termination of
Parental
Rights**

0.82%

Yes

Yes

36

Adoption*

0.73%

Yes

Yes

40

Support
(Other)*

0.55%

Mixed

Yes

14

Guardianship
(Juvenile)

0.45%

Yes

Yes

25

Dependency
(Other)**

0.34%

Yes

Yes

17

Support
Private/
Non-IVD*

0.31%

Mixed

Yes

9

Visitation*

0.07%

Mixed

Yes

15

36–40
(16.91%–
21.91%)

13–28
(5.46%–
7.63%)
25–40
(1.66%–
2.87%)
20–36
(1.37%–
1.96%)
18–30
(1.12%–
1.65%)
23–32
(0.59%–
1.18%)
28–41
(0.74%–
0.88%)
34–43
(0.67%–
0.80%)
7–19
(0.38%–
0.80%)
19–31
(0.28%–
0.55%)
10–23
(0.13%–
0.80%)
4–13
(0.16%–
0.43%)
7–21
(0.06%–
0.08%)

6. See supra notes 99 & 102–107 and accompanying text regarding estimates
of total debt collection matters across “Contract” and “Small Claims” case types.
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Yes

Yes

12

4–16
(0.01%–
0.07%)

8.83%

Yes

Yes

20

11–27
(2.69%–
11.96%)

Landlord/Tena
nt (Other)

3.65%

Yes

Yes

13

Mortgage
Foreclosure

2.48%

Yes

Yes

26

Contract Total

8.15%
5.06%

No

Yes

18

Contract
(Other)

3.01%

No

No

14

Buyer
(Plaintiff)

0.09%

No

No

8

Other Total

8.10%

Civil (Other)

4.54%

No

No

15

Writs

2.70%

No

No

19

0.56%

No

No

32

0.25%

No

No

31

24–34
(0.17%–
0.38%)

0.04%

No

No

19

16–21
(0.01%–
0.08%)

Dependency
(No Fault)**

Housing Total
Landlord/Tena
nt (Unlawful
Detainer)

Seller/
Plaintiff (Debt
Collection)7

Appeal From
Administrative
Agency
Appeal From
Limited
Jurisdiction
Court
Civil Appeals
(Other)

0.05%

14.95%

8–17
(1.17%–
5.49%)
16–31
(1.84%–
3.41%)

12–23
(4.20%–
5.98%)
5–19
(0.25%–
4.94%)
3–13
(0.01%–
0.31%)

8–19
(2.76%–
6.22%)
12–23
(1.41%–
4.47%)
28–37
(0.43%–
0.81%)

7. See supra notes 99 & 102–107 and accompanying text regarding estimates
of total debt collection matters across “Contract” and “Small Claims” case types.
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Tort Total

2.25%

Automobile
Tort

1.57%

Mixed

Mixed

20

Tort (Other)

0.25%

No

No

14

Premises
Liability

0.15%

No

No

13

Intentional
Tort

0.11%

No

No

15

Malpractice
(Medical)

0.07%

Yes

Yes

20

Product
Liability

0.06%

No

No

19

Malpractice
(Other)

0.02%

Yes

Yes

16

Slander/Libel/
Defamation

0.01%

No

No

12

Fraud

0.01%

Mixed

Mixed

9

Tax

1.33%

No

No

17

Property NonHousing Total

0.48%

Real Property
(Other)

0.43%

No

No

21

Eminent
Domain

0.05%

No

Yes

25

Employment
Total

0.09%

10–27
(1.15%–
1.96%)
6–19
(0.10%–
0.32%)
5–18
(0.11%–
0.19%)
7–21
(0.08%–
0.13%)
9–28
(0.05%–
0.09%)
11–27
(0.03%–
0.11%)
9–12
(0.02%–
0.03%)
4–18
(0.01%–
0.02%)
4–13
(0.00%–
0.01%)

Tax
12–20
(0.72%–
1.64%)

15–27
(0.29%–
0.51%)
20–28
(0.04%–
0.06%)
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Employment
(Other)

0.06%

Mixed

Yes

11

Employment
Discrimination

0.03%

Mixed

Yes

14

Low Estimate
of Social
Needs, Total
High Estimate
of Social
Needs, Total

7

5–17
(0.02%–
0.11%)
7–20
(0.03%–
0.03%)

31% (presented)–46% (presented/underlying)
90% (presented)–95% (presented/underlying)

Table 3 – Federal Civil Cases8
2012–
2012–2019
2019
Annual Average
Total
Contract, Total
211,118
26,390
Real Property, Total
70,331
8,791
Tort Actions, Total
544,183
68,023
Actions Under Statutes, Total 1,445,036
180,630
Prisoner Petitions
465,573
58,197
Civil Rights
309,606
38,701
Labor Laws
145,201
18,150
Intellectual Property
100,187
12,523
Social Security
149,645
18,706
Consumer Credit
78,756
9,845
Other Statutes
196,068
24,509
TOTAL
2,270,668
283,834

2012–2019
Proportion
9.30%
3.10%
23.97%
63.64%
20.50%
13.64%
6.39%
4.41%
6.59%
3.47%
8.63%
100%

8. This data is drawn from the federal judiciary’s annual reporting. Statistical Tables
for the Federal Judiciary, U.S. Cts., https://www.uscourts.gov/statistics-reports/analysisreports/statistical-tables-federal-judiciary [https://perma.cc/C78N-T72T] (last visited Feb.
10, 2022).
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